FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

# Daily Report

# East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-208
Thursday
27 October 1994

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

# Daily Report
East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-94-208* CONTENTS *27 October 1994*

**NOTICE TO READERS:** The processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication have been changed. All indicators now begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

**ALBANIA**

PD's Selami Discusses Support for Constitution *[Tirana Radio]* ..... 1
PSD Chairman Holds News Conference *[Tirana Radio]* ..... 1
Berisha Receives PRC Group; Comments on Ties *[Tirana Radio]* ..... 2
Official on Mining Privatization Progress *[LAJMI I DITES 16 Oct]* ..... 2

**SLOVAKIA**

Kovac Receives U.S. Presidential Assistant *[Bratislava Radio]* ..... 3
Kozlik Outlines HZDS Coalition Ideas, Terms *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 24 Oct]* ..... 3
Joint Choice Signs Agreement on Cooperation *[Bratislava Radio]* ..... 4
NR SR Chairman Discusses Topical Issues *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 19 Oct]* ..... 4
'Caretaker Government' Possible *[NARODNA OBRODA 21 Oct]* ..... 6
No Agreement at Meeting *[Bratislava Radio]* ..... 7
Uranium Smuggling Reported Impossible To Prevent *[DENNIK 21 Oct]* ..... 7
Current Crime Situation in Republic Examined *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 22 Oct]* ..... 7
Official Gives 'Shocking' Drug Addiction Figures *[SME 22 Oct]* ..... 8

**HUNGARY**

Foreign Envoys on Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty *[Budapest TV]* ..... 9
Defense Official on Reorganizing Security Tasks *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 23 Oct]* ..... 9
Finance Minister Cited on State of Economy *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 10
PRC Official Interviewed on Visit, Taiwan Issue *[NEPSZABADSAG 24 Oct]* ..... 10

**POLAND**

Foreign Affairs Minister Submits Resignation *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 11
Olechowski Issues Statement *[PAP]* ..... 11
Justice Minister Cimoszewicz Addresses Sejm *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 11
Mazowiecki Urges Tougher International Action *[Rome L'UNITA 22 Oct]* ..... 13
Poll Shows Less Trust in Walesa, Pawlak *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 27 Oct]* ..... 14
Battle in PdP Over Talks With Right-Wing *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 27 Oct]* ..... 14
Poll on Responsibility for Inflation Rate *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 26 Oct]* ..... 15

**ROMANIA**

Council of Europe Official Visits Bucharest *[Bucharest Radio]* ..... 17
Iliescu, Tarchys Examine Ties *[Bucharest Radio]* ..... 17

**BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

UN Confirms 'Significant' Gains by Bosnian Army *[AFP]* ..... 18
Dudakovic on 'Crushed' Serbs *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 18
Corps Advance Continues *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 18
'Several' Tanks Captured *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 18

General Staff Statement *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 19
7th Corps Reportedly at Kupres 'Doorstep' *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 19
TANJUG Notes Conflict in 7th Corps ..... 19
Heavy Muslim Artillery Attack on Serb Doboj *[TANJUG]* ..... 20
Further Roundup of Regional Combat Reports *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 20
Serbs: Muslims Fail To Withdraw From DMZ *[TANJUG]* ..... 21
Serbs Claim UN Bangladeshi Unit Arming Muslims *[TANJUG]* ..... 21
Croat Leader Assails Silajdzic's Attitude *[Mostar Radio]* ..... 21
Bosnian Serb Leader Views Future Options *[OSLOBODJENJE 11 Oct]* ..... 22

## CROATIA

Talks Between Authorities, Serbs To Begin *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 25
RSK Delegation Leaves for Zagreb *[TANJUG]* ..... 25
Negotiations Begin *[TANJUG]* ..... 25
Babic's Absence Noted *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 25
Martic Views UN Policy *[TANJUG]* ..... 25
Tudjman Meets With Lord Owen, Stoltenberg *[Zagreb TV]* ..... 26
Owen Says Milosevic Supporting Serbs in Croatia *[TANJUG]* ..... 26
Reported 'Z-4' Group Plan Seen as 'Defeat' *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 20 Oct]* ..... 26
RSK's Martic Discusses 'Internal Tensions' *[BORBA 25 Oct]* ..... 28
Martic Cabinet Refutes Report *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 22 Oct]* ..... 28
Refugees Dissatisfied With UN Resolution 947 *[VJESNIK 5 Oct]* ..... 29

## THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Local VMRO-DPMNE Branches Protest Boycott *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 26 Oct]* ..... 30
Parties Assess Need for Election Boycott *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 26 Oct]* ..... 30
Participation in Second Electoral Round Estimated *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 26 Oct]* ..... 31
Ethnic Groups Express Doubts About Elections *[PULS 23 Sep]* ..... 32
Prospects for Veteran Politician Tupurkovski *[PULS 2 Sep]* ..... 34

## SLOVENIA

Government Approves Revised Budget Proposal *[REPUBLIKA 1 Oct]* ..... 38

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Federal

Milosevic Receives Owen, Stoltenberg in Belgrade *[TANJUG]* ..... 39

### Serbia

Interest in Partisan Press Declining *[POLITIKA 15 Sep]* ..... 39
Mira Markovic Interviewed on Serb-Albanian Ties *[INTERVJU 19 Aug]* ..... 40

## PD's Selami Discusses Support for Constitution

*AU2610193394 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference held in the Palace of Congresses today, Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Eduard Selami said, among other things: We welcome the fact that the majority of the people support the constitution, because to support the constitution at present means to support democracy. PD Secretary General Tritan Shehu and Tomorr Dosti were also present at the conference. Here is a report:

[Correspondent Antoneta Malja] The support that the idea of a referendum on the constitution is finding among the people is an expression of advanced political culture, said PD Chairman Selami at a news conference held in one of the halls of the Palace of Congresses. The experiences of other countries have been considered in compiling this draft constitution. Albania needs this constitution, because it is related to the law on the protection of human rights and freedoms. It is like a passport for Albania's entry into Europe, he said.

Selami stressed that it is important to take the constitution away from the table of party discussions, and this means expanding the democratic space.

Reporters from various media posed numerous questions. Asked about the stance maintained by the opposition, Selami answered that the opposition is in political chaos. The Socialist Party [PS] is paying a real price for its policy. What distinguishes this referendum is that PS members have largely united on constitutional issues. To talk about their threats at present means to make another mistake and to fail to understand how far you are from your electorate, your party.

Asked about the interest in the constitution exhibited at the Council of Europe's Strasbourg meeting, Shehu answered that it was we who presented the invitation. There will be no trial of the constitution there—whether to accept it or not—as the opposition has stated in its own newspapers. We will welcome every suggestion.

PD Chairman Selami further expanded the idea that a yes from the people for the constitution will be an advantage and a positive signal not only for membership in the Council of Europe, but also for foreign investors.

Responding to a question on the position of the Social Democratic Party, it was said that two lines exist in this party. These have been clearly expressed not only in the current referendum, but also in other issues as well. One sides with the PS; the other with the PD. It is up to them to decide which direction to follow. However, the fact that the majority has supported the constitution is to be welcomed. To support the constitution today is—and means—to support democracy.

## PSD Chairman Holds News Conference

*AU2610215994 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[Report by Arben Muka on news conference by PSD Chairman Skender Gjinushi with foreign and domestic correspondents at the Palace of Congresses in Tirana on 26 October]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the name of his party, Mr. Gjinushi first read a press statement. The statement says the third conference of the Albanian Social Democratic Party [PSD] analyzed the course of the main processes in our country over a one-year period in the highly important economic, social, judicial, and political fields. Two cardinal problems occupied a major place in this conference: the draft constitution and the PSD's current political stance. Regarding these two problems, decisions and relevant resolutions were put forward and were approved almost unanimously by the conference.

After focusing on the procedure of presenting the draft constitution, Gjinushi stated further, in the statement:

[Begin recording] The [word indistinct] declared at rallies in the name of the PSD name are manipulations of the RTSh, the Democratic Party, and the president himself. We do not recognize certain suspicious persons who speak in the name of our party. They are deceiving the public and have no mandate. The PSD electorate does not follow the lead of these people but rather that of its legitimate representatives. This is blackmail and [word indistinct] against the PSD and is also antidemocratic. [end recording]

The PSD leader put forward the main objections which, according to him, infringed upon the content of the draft constitution.

First, the state model outlined in the draft constitution is not relevant to our concepts and principles, Gjinushi said. It does not resemble any European model either.

Second, this model is theoretical and as such, brings up contradictions and political crises that are unnecessary for the future.

Third, the prerogatives of the parliament become very restricted, while the president accumulates all the possible prerogatives of the three branches, and the independence of the judicial system is violated.

The Social Democrats also state that the population's sovereignty is violated in four instances. Article 130 makes this constitution irrevocable in the future.

Skender Gjinushi also answered reporters' questions on various problems related to the position of the Social Democrats during the campaign, on the eve of the approval of the draft constitution by referendum.

Responding to a question by the Deutsche Welle correspondent on the stance of Teodor Laco, a party official who favored the referendum and the draft constitution

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

in an article in today's edition of the newspaper POPULLI PO, Gjinushi explained:

[Begin recording] We are all for the referendum. We are against violations in procedure, for which our parliamentary group has forwarded a request on an anticonstitutional act, which is in fact signed by Mr. Laco. As for other statements, if they are personal, everyone has his own personality and is personally responsible for his own tactics and stances. [end recording]

Gjinushi was also asked about whether or not factions exist within the party, the stance to be maintained by the party after the referendum, right- and left-wing tendencies in the PDS, etc.

## Berisha Receives PRC Group; Comments on Ties

*AU2610192394 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian President Sali Berisha today received a delegation of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference [CPPCC] led by CPPCC Deputy Chairman Wan Guoquan.

I am happy to receive you and I am convinced that your visit will be an important contribution toward strengthening Albanian-Chinese friendship and further developing relations between both our countries.

President Berisha expressed his regret that Enver Hoxha broke off relations with Beijing when China embarked upon the road of reform. Berisha said Albanian-Chinese relations, which have been resumed by democratic Albania, should develop to their highest potential in all fields.

President Berisha conveyed his greetings to Ten Tsiao Pin, the founder of genuine perestroika, as well as to President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Li Peng. He expressed his desire to receive the Chinese president in Albania.

Wan Guoquan thanked the president for the reception and conveyed greetings from President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister Li Peng, and CPPCC Chairman Li Huan. Wan Guoquan said China aims to strengthen the friendly relations between both our countries. Chinese policy in the Balkans intends to make its own contribution to a just and logical solution. He thanked Albania for the political attitude of one China in the world. [sentence as heard]

## Official on Mining Privatization Progress

*AU2510140194 Tirana LAJMI I DITES in Albanian 16 Oct 94 p 5*

[Report by "G.M.": "Is Privatization the Future of the Mines?"]

[Text] According to Sokol Mati, head of the General Directorate of Mines, "the future of the mines lies in privatization." In fact, the process started long ago. The existing enterprises have been issued permits to work the copper and chromium mines and to carry out geological research. Meanwhile, there are approximately 45 private firms exploiting gypsum, kaolin, limestone, and marble deposits. Companies such as Albeton, Cipa, and Albinfrastruktura in Tirana, plus many others in Vlore, Shkoder, and Milot, are in full operation to support construction work in the country. "We have set up a working group to study ways of privatizing the mines, the necessary laws that must be passed, and the timing of the privatization," said Mr. Mati.

With regard to copper, one of our country's biggest mineral resources, a development and investment plan is being drawn up that will be approved this year, and funds should start to become available in January. The objective is full processing of copper into wires and cables, rather than to export it in the form of blister and electrolytic copper. The Albcrom company hopes to enter into a joint venture with a U.S.-British firm.

As far as the iron mines are concerned, simply because they are unprofitable, they have no near prospects of being worked. "We have received offers for the silicate-nickel of Bitinska, and for this purpose we have sent samples for analysis to Norway," Mr. Mati says. Italian and other foreign firms have sent us offers for joint ventures with Albanian geological enterprises.

In the meantime, there are approximately 100 requests from private firms to exploit various mineral resources. However, privatization of the mines, even the small ones, is difficult because they need a great deal of capital investment, which is hardly affordable without foreign partners. Experts recommend joint ventures as the best way to go. There is also a subjective reason: The private firms do not know the legislation well enough, and their applications for privatization are consequently incomplete. In the General Directorate of Mines, work is under way to complement mining legislation as much as possible with paralegal acts, so that Albania's Mining Law, which was passed in 1994, will become fully applicable.

For the firms that are presently exploiting various mineral resources, this directorate is overseeing the implementation of legislation and closely following their production activities.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

### Kovac Receives U.S. Presidential Assistant

*LD2610173594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] President Michal Kovac today received in Bratislava Richard Schifter, assistant to the U.S. President, head of the National Security Council, and vice chairman of the U.S. Controlling Committee for Central and East Europe.

The U.S. guest said that Washington is monitoring with interest the postelection situation in Slovakia and believes in further democratic progress and in continuation of the economic reform.

President Kovac expressed the conviction that, despite difficult coalition discussions, the new government will continue Slovakia's current moves toward the reinforcement of democracy and building a market economy.

### Kozlik Outlines HZDS Coalition Ideas, Terms

*AU2610140094 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 24 Oct 94 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with HZDS Deputy Chairman Sergej Kozlik by Eva Zelenayova; place and date not given: "Provisional Government Conceals the Truth"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Farmers Party of Slovakia [RSS] are continuing political consultations on the formation of a coalition government. We spoke with HZDS Deputy Chairman Sergej Kozlik about their prospects, about why it is more convenient to hide in opposition, and why the HZDS must raise some problems that have polarized the Slovak political scene in the wake of March 1994. [passage omitted]

[Zelenayova] How would you characterize the political talks held thus far? To what conclusions have they led, and what are their results?

[Kozlik] One week ago, we ended the opening round of talks and in the HZDS Political Board we noted that they did not bring results. Quite the contrary, they were not successful. One of the reasons was that some political parties had literally shielded themselves with conditions that prevented a rapprochement of positions. In other words, the barriers remained. Last week we started official talks, with varying results. Relations with the Slovak National Party [SNS], which is our traditional partner, are on a good track. The SNS is so accommodating that it does not even insist on its participation in the government, should this stand in the way of forming a broader coalition. The Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] has not managed to rise above treating the attitude toward the president and toward the Democratic Union [DU] as taboos. It refused to discuss these problems in a businesslike way. As for talks with the Common Choice, we assess them positively. After an initially cool atmosphere, the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] opened the door a bit, and we managed to speak about problems concerning the president, the stabilization of parliament and the political scene, the government's rendering of account, and programmatic issues. Relations with the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] are developing well, and I assume that we could arrive at political agreement at parliamentary level. We acknowledge the fact that the ZRS does not want to join the government. Hungarian parties have renounced talks with the HZDS in writing, and we do not expect to hold any talks with DU.

[Zelenayova] Could you specify the problems standing in the way of a broad coalition?

[Kozlik] An open issue, from the viewpoint of guarantees for the future government, are our relations with the president. We have to realize that late last year, the president became involved on the political scene in an unfortunate manner, which resulted in a political crisis. He addressed many harsh words to the HZDS, whether this was in parliament in March or later, which we cannot ignore. If for no other reason than because we are again facing the task of government formation and must ask what position the president will assume this time. In the final analysis, by clarifying this relationship, we are also protecting our potential coalition partners. They, too, should take an interest in the attitude the president of the Slovak Republic has and intends to have toward the HZDS. He has not declared thus far what this attitude is, which is why we asked him whether he considers the outcome of the election successful and, if not, what steps he intends to take. It was also appropriate to ask him whether he will not draw certain conclusions from his part in the political crisis that emerged in the Slovak Republic and in the polarization of the political situation, given the fact that the election did not prove him right—that is, whether he does not want to draw also certain personal conclusions, of which resignation would be one possibility. However, I would not want the impression to be created that this is the sole possible course of action, as has been suggested in the press. There are many possible solutions and that is precisely what we want to discuss with political parties, be it the shortening of his term of office, the establishment of a commission to assess the president's activities, or his self-reflection and the declaration of his attitude toward the HZDS. Basically, the only issue is whether political partners will be willing to discuss those questions. In our talks with the SDL, for example, we said that we could find partners for the establishment of such a commission in parliament but would not insist that each political partner participating in government formation would also have to participate in the establishment of such a commission.

[Zelenayova] Do you concede the possibility of the HZDS going into opposition?

[Kozlik] I do not. The HZDS did not win the election to go into opposition. We want to actively influence the policy of this state and think that we are prepared for it.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Zelenayova] A great deal is being said and written about the HZDS wanting to change the parliamentary system into a presidential system. Is it true?

[Kozlik] We have never perceived this issue as a problem, nor have we ever raised it as a condition. [passage omitted]

[Zelenayova] The KDH has made its participation in the coalition conditional on the participation of DU, even though it knows that this condition is unacceptable to the HZDS. Setting such conditions by parties is virtually tantamount to their cowardly retreat into opposition. [SDL Deputy Chairman] Pavol Kanis voiced an interesting idea in this context: "For what did we need the state when everyone wants to be in opposition?" Why do you think parties shun bearing responsibility for this state in the period to come?

[Kozlik] One of the reasons could be that the results achieved by the provisional government are not such as declared by it. The state contingency reserves have been exhausted, massive promises have been made to education and health care, and the solution to some financial problems has been transferred to the National Property Fund [FNM] of the Slovak Republic. In other words, problems exist,but they do not feature on the account of the state budget but, rather, on the FNM account. Arrears in health care are estimated at more than 3 billion korunas [Sk] and in education at perhaps Sk2 billion. The trade unions, which were silent for half a year, are making themselves heard and are threatening to teach the new government a lesson. They intend to resort even to extreme measures if the government does not meet their demands. All of these are warning signals showing that it is not in the least lucrative to go into the government today. But those who are responsible for this situation must render account for it. One of our demands is that the provisional government should step down only after it renders a businesslike account of its activity. It is now really immensely difficult to go into the government, and the fact that we want to form the government is doing us credit. But this makes thorough guarantees for the new government, especially in the initial period, which will entail great risks, all the more necessary. After all, we cannot allow our partners to pull out when the first problems appear.

[Zelenayova] Problematic issues also include the stabilization of parliament. The HZDS raised in this context the issue of deputies' imperative mandate [imperativny mandat]....

[Kozlik] I make no secret of the fact that, for some time, we did raise this possibility. After the election, however, we no longer speak about this. When we demand the stabilization of parliament, we are thinking of establishing a model similar to the one adopted in Hungary, which would establish a mechanism of possible movement of deputies in parliament. In other words, we seek a mechanism that would prevent the formation of independent clubs of deputies.

[Zelenayova] What is your negotiating partners' view of this problem?

[Kozlik] SDL representatives have acknowledged the need to address this problem.

[Zelenayova] The conditions laid down by the HZDS during political talks have met with strong response in the mass media. Why, in your opinion?

[Kozlik] The problems we are discussing really require a solution. They are all problems of political stability and of the future government's stability. We have had painful experience. After we laid the foundations for the new state, at a time when we should have harvested the fruits of our efforts, someone else appropriated the results of our work. Today, when problems are piling up again and when we again face the formation of a government, we do not want to commit a similar mistake again and join the government with our backs not covered. After resolving the most difficult problems, we could then again get into the same situation as in March 1994. This is why we proceed the way we do.

### Joint Choice Signs Agreement on Cooperation

*LD2610161794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The coalition partners of the Joint Choice [coalition of Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), Green Party of Slovakia (SZS), and Farmers' Movement in Slovakia (HP)], signed in Bratislava today, a short while ago, an agreement on postelection cooperation. Robert Beno reports:

[Beno] We have shown, by signing the agreement, that we want to continue to cooperate, said SDL Chairman Peter Weiss. When asked whether the individual partners in the coalition have the right to hold talks separately or whether some can be in opposition while others are in the government, SDSS Chairman Jaroslav Volf said that the agreement envisaged the possibility that they might not agree on all issues. Each partner is independent, but so far they have always agreed on the most important issues—for example, joining the coalition government. According to the SDSS chairman, the agreement can be revised, abolished, or rewritten.

SZS Chairman Jozef Pokorny said that the agreement gave them the right to conduct independent talks with other parties, but the rest of the coalition had to be informed about the talks. The coalition will have the name Joint Choice for the time being, although this is still an open issue. Volf says that they will be discussing in the parliamentary group how to clearly define the Joint Choice's political orientation.

### NR SR Chairman Discusses Topical Issues

*AU2510175494 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 19 Oct 94 p 5*

[Interview with Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, by L. Jurik;

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

place and date not given: "Let the Victor Lay Down His Arms and the Vanquished His Hatred"—reprinted from LITERARNY TYZDENNIK No. 42, 14 October]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Jurik] One of the key moments of the previous electoral period was the speech made by the president on 11 March, in which he assessed the domestic political situation and very sharply criticized the government of V. Meciar. You are one of the politicians who criticized the president for making this speech...

[Gasparovic] I want to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. I want to make clear that I was not then nor am I now criticizing the institution of president. However, I am convinced that President Michal Kovac committed a grave political error and I am absolutely certainly obliged to point this out to him. Michal Kovac was the candidate of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and it was mainly due to this movement that he was given a historical opportunity. I think he was acting correctly when he declared himself president of all of the citizens of Slovakia. A president has to be the president of all citizens. However, the spirit of this undoubtedly correct notion evaporated after a time, and the president began to behave oddly: He surrounded himself with advisers and experts from such contradictory political streams that only ideological chaos could come of it. Representatives from the former VPN [Public Against Violence], in particular, worked very hard on the president. The president soon became the spokesman for his advisers. He began to take steps that were at variance with his powers and that, in my opinion, objectively harmed the Slovak Republic by destabilizing the domestic political scene. The president was coming into conflict with Prime Minister Meciar more and more often. For this reason and in this sense, I criticized the president in PRACA on 31 August 1994. The president replied in the same paper (on 2 September) that I was wrong and was being misleading because the political crisis had been triggered by the resignation of some deputies from the HZDS Parliamentary Club. Yes, but these resignations were also a result of the president's activities. As early as September 1993, the president invited HZDS deputies and ministers in the Meciar government to discuss with him the possibility of replacing the prime minister. Before the meeting with U.S. President Clinton in Prague, we met in his office and talked about the stances and points of view we would discuss with Clinton. We got around to assessing Mr. Meciar's qualities. The president indicated to me that there are no problems between us, that I am more communicative, and that I could be the prime minister. (I hope the president remembers this). He made this offer, as I found out later, to several politicians, even to members of the Meciar government. In December 1993, at the 25th Session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR], when the budget was approved, NR SR Foreign Committee Chairman I. Laluha came up to me and warned me that J. Moravcik and R. Kovac, with the support of the president, wanted to propose a vote of no confidence in Meciar in conjunction with the possible nonapproval of the budget. I asked him to call Moravcik. They both came, and there was a serious discussion of the situation in the government, parliament, and the HZDS. Moravcik indicated to me that it was necessary to recall Meciar, that several HZDS deputies would go along with him, and that I could be one of them. This came as a shock to me. I told him to resolve these problems at the HZDS assembly in March and refused to discuss it further. The president and his advisers had taken these steps long before he made his speech in the NR SR on 11 March. Without a doubt, he had prepared himself carefully for this step. Just before the president made his speech in parliament, I asked him what he would say. He told me that he would give his assessment of the situation, but he did not say a word about sharply criticizing Meciar or pushing for his recall. I am not casting doubt on the president's right to speak in parliament. I just think his speech was not only incorrect, but was also dangerous for the country's future. What purpose has all of this served? How has this served the interests of the Slovak Republic? What has it resolved? Sincerely and realistically, the government was replaced for six months, a left-right coalition was formed without any cohesion and logic (the only cohesion it had was a negativist maxim—that is, opposition to Meciar and the HZDS), and, moreover, the coalition was dependent on the Hungarian deputies. The entire transformation process has been slowed down, there had to be a new election, and even the election results have not altered fundamentally the political scene in Slovakia. We have lost precious time, and we will start where we stopped. It is definitely not propitious that, at this complicated time, the Slovak Republic has a controversial president, who wants to grow above his role.

[Jurik] You have said that the former coalition government was more or less dependent on the Hungarian political parties. The issue of ethnic minorities, especially the Hungarian minority, is still a sore point in Slovak politics. Allow me to play devil's advocate and ask the following: What might happen? Why can Hungarians in southern Slovakia not have autonomy?

[Gasparovic] The issue of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia cannot be underestimated. I am convinced that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia really has above-standard rights, and I could prove this with dozens of examples, facts, and figures. The Slovak Republic pursues a peaceful foreign policy, it has an intrinsic interest in getting on well with all of its neighbors and all nations of the world, and it has no territorial or other claims. The Slovak Constitution guarantees all rights to all citizens equally and is based on the civic—not the ethnic or national—principle. Approximately 500,000 Hungarians live in southern Slovakia, but almost 1 million Slovaks live there. It is an ethnically mixed region. The strategy of Hungarian politicians, however, is far-reaching, and we have no guarantees that, after the possible creation of autonomy, they will not attempt—let us say, in the form of a referendum or international

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

treaties under the patronage of the powers—to annex southern Slovakia to Hungary. How else can the constantly escalating demands of the Hungarian politicians in Slovakia be explained? Why is there still a reluctance to draft and sign a bilateral agreement in which there would be a clause on the unchangeability of the mutual borders? Why is there so much talk about casting doubt on the Trianon Agreements, whose validity will soon come to an end? I have to state absolutely explicitly that autonomy is quite unacceptable for Slovak policy. We will not change anything in this policy because any other policy would inevitably lead to catastrophe—to a catastrophe of global dimensions. Southern Slovakia—that is, Gabcikovo—is the reservoir of drinking water in Europe. It is a strategic source of grains and foods.

[Jurik] When the leftist-oriented Horn government came into office, it seemed that the policy toward Slovakia would also change.

[Gasparovic] This was merely rhetoric. The traditional instinct of Hungarian policy is encrypted within Greater Hungary, and they sustain this illusion not only through various resentments, but also through statements made by some Western politicians. Let us take a close look at the statements made by French Prime Minister E. Balladur—that the border can be changed by administrative means and that it is necessary to reach a satisfactory solution to the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia—or the original version of the so-called Balladur Peace Plan. We do not understand who authorized the prime minister to draft a peace plan in such a manner, why he is interfering in the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic and what he is pursuing by doing so. If the prime minister continues in this spirit, Slovakia will have to reassess its signing of his plan. The Hungarians lost two major wars, and it was their own fault that they lost the territory they previously held and where other nations lived. I repeat: We want to live in peace and friendship with the Hungarian nation. It is close to us on account of its history, culture, traditions, and even mentality. The Slovaks in the south of our territory live together well. However, aggressive statements by Hungarian politicians in Slovakia are already beginning to be reflected in the increased aggression of ordinary citizens. This is being felt by those Slovaks who live in southern Slovakia and who are complaining about discrimination. This simply has to stop. There is still enough time to think and behave realistically, to the satisfaction of everyone. I really want to believe that the Horn government will also reason in this spirit.

[Jurik] The Slovak Republic's foreign policy should define its priorities, fundamental line, and constants. Obviously, the lack of these basic requirements also causes misunderstandings on the international scene...

[Gasparovic] [passage omitted] We nearly paid for one such misunderstanding when we were almost not admitted to the Council of Europe [CE]. The ceremonial act of admitting, or rather readmitting, the Czech and Slovak Republics had been planned for 30 June 1993. Before our admission to the CE, Prime Minister Meciar instructed the then foreign minister, Moravcik, to meet with his Hungarian counterpart, G. Jeszensky. He was to discuss the change in Hungary's stance toward our admission, which Hungary had made conditional upon the agreement of the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia. Moravcik had the advantage in the talks because he knew about the agreement reached by the European states in Crans Montana, where the strategy for our admission into the CE was discussed. However, after his return from Hungary, Moravcik appeared in the media and cast doubts on our admission. He did not take any steps to thwart the Hungarian efforts by diplomatic means. He even telephoned me on the morning of my departure for Strasbourg and asked me if I was going to the CE, if there was any point. He was not going because we would not be admitted into the CE. Only my sharp and not very polite reply forced him to go to Strasbourg. In Strasbourg, we and the NR SR deputies did all we could to ensure that the Hungarians did not veto the Slovak Republic's admission to the CE. And, when they admitted us, Moravcik came up with a nonchalantly prepared speech, as if all the credit was due to him... [passage omitted]

## 'Caretaker Government' Possible

*AU2510145494 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 21 Oct 94 p 2*

[TA SR report: "I. Gasparovic Is Not Ruling Out a Caretaker Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"There should be no greater interest for the political entities and their representatives than the effort to create favorable conditions for the universal development of the state and its inhabitants. The results of the parliamentary election can also be assessed in relation to the level of responsibility for respecting democratic principles and values and for transforming not only the economy, but also the spiritual life of society," said Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR], in an interview granted to a TA SR correspondent yesterday.

In giving his analysis of the current consultative meetings between the individual political groupings, Gasparovic commented that their aim must be a functional and stable parliament capable of supporting the new cabinet's program. "The greatest tragedy for Slovakia would be a deadlock in the NR SR that the president of the Republic would have to resolve by calling a new parliamentary election."

Gasparovic did not confirm that the possibility of forming a government without the "political elite" was discussed at his recent meeting with President Michal Kovac. He sees forming a caretaker government as one of the possibilities for resolving the current domestic political situation. According to him, finding the common aims and points of contact in the programs of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the individual political parties and, on the basis of them, developing mutual cooperation would be a better option.

The NR SR chairman does not think that an agreement on the proportional or majority principle in filling the most senior posts in parliament will be reached at the meeting involving the chairmen of the parties and groupings on 26 October. However, he believes that, a week before the constituent meeting of the NR SR in the first electoral period of the independent Slovakia, the individual representatives will put forward their aims more unequivocally and will express their possible willingness to cooperate. There should also be a "gentleman's agreement" on the replacements for the deputies who are members of the current cabinet. According to Gasparovic, the decision by the Constitutional Court on the complaint submitted by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Farmers' Party of Slovakia will also influence this agreement. However, the votes taken by the deputies themselves will decide on the stability of parliament and the executive, said Gasparovic in conclusion.

### No Agreement at Meeting

*LD2510163994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 25 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Leading representatives of parliamentary groups, parties, and movements met in Bratislava today to discuss issues related to the constituent meeting of the National Council.

According to Speaker Ivan Gasparovic, who initiated this kind of meeting for the second time, there was no agreement on the ways of nominating and electing the top leaders of the parliament. There was also no agreement on whether a majority or proportional system should be applied in the nominations.

According to some of those who took part in the talks, the most controversial view concerned the participation by members of the present Moravcik government in the parliament's constituent meeting and the nomination of their substitutes.

## Uranium Smuggling Reported Impossible To Prevent

*AU2510172194 Bratislava DENNIK in Slovak 21 Oct 94 pp 14-15*

[Interview with Dr. Jaromir Kaliciak, director of the Central Customs Administration, by Vladimir Donner; place and date not given: "Not Even Our Customs Officers Can Discover Uranium Smuggled for an Atomic Bomb"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Donner] Let us turn to radioactive uranium. Are our border crossing points safe from its conveyance?

[Kaliciak] We have been equipped with detectors since the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. However, they are no longer suitable.

[Donner] So, it is possible to bring a kilogram of uranium in a lead container across our border?

[Kaliciak] At the moment, without the necessary equipment, we cannot prevent this. The Germans have been involved in most of the cases concerning the discovery of uranium. They have adapted their ports and airports for this, but even they do not have the necessary equipment at road border crossing points. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on supervising the centers where such materials can be obtained for smuggling.

[Donner] Do you agree with the view that it is possible to smuggle across our borders enough radioactive uranium to make an atomic bomb?

[Kaliciak] In essence, yes. No customs officer can detect it without the necessary equipment—not only our customs officers but also customs officers throughout Europe.

## Current Crime Situation in Republic Examined

*AU2510151394 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 22 Oct 94 p 4*

[Article by Marian Dudinsky: "Almost 108,000 Crimes"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The crime figures for the past nine months are not at all flattering. Just under 38 percent of the more than 100,000 crimes were solved. Property-related crime is way in the lead—84,480 crimes have been reported since January, while only 25.3 percent of them have been cleared up. It is obvious that the most difficult thing here is to document the origin of dirty money or getting rich overnight...

Of the more than 30,000 break-ins, 3,348 of them involved the burglary of apartments; approximately 30 percent of them were cleared up. Compared with the 18-percent clear-up rate at the beginning of the year, this is a success, but we cannot rejoice over it. Likewise, it is a Klondike here for car thieves because they have managed to steal 6,735 vehicles, while only 15 percent of them were returned to their owners. So far, 80 of the 93 murders have been solved.

### Police Crime

Since the beginning of the year, charges have been brought against 109 police officers—six of whom were commanders!—for various crimes. The most common charge against them was abuse of the authority of a public official and corruption, but charges of bodily harm, theft, embezzlement, fraud, and other typical transgressions were also brought against them. These crimes were committed most often by the order-enforcement and criminal branches and involved the youngest members of the services. For this reason, the Interior Ministry Inspectorate will shortly resume its activities.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Slovak Middlemen**

Our young country is obviously already a component of criminal Europe because the repertoire of crimes committed on our territory is as extensive as the old continent itself. There are kidnappings and trafficking in arms, nuclear materials, drugs.... Cases involving the sale of human embryos are at the investigation stage! Let us take the following as an illustration: Four Slovak citizens were apprehended recently in Slovenske Nove Mesto in the Trebisov District on whom 750 grams of Uranium 235 were found! This month, 531 kilograms of explosives were discovered in house searches, and 1,840 grams of heroin were detected on our border-crossing points. [passage omitted]

## Official Gives 'Shocking' Drug Addiction Figures

*AU2510140994 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Oct 94 p 3*

[Article by "(uj)": "Heroin in Bratislava Costs 15 Times Less Than Abroad; The Number of Heroin Addicts in the Slovak Republic Went Up by 437 Percent Last Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—One gram of heroin costs 15 times less in Slovakia than, for example, in the Netherlands. You can get it in Zilina for 1,000 korunas [Sk] and in Petrzalka for Sk1,200-1,500. Heroin is doing so well in Slovakia that it has become the second most "successful" habit-forming substance.

This statement was made yesterday by Dr. Ivan Chaban, the Health Ministry's senior expert on problems associated with alcoholism and drug addiction, in reference to the shocking figures on the drug situation in the Slovak Republic. Admittedly, our drug scene is not yet complete and has not been mapped out fully, but we are rapidly picking up all of the global trends. The situation is worst in Bratislava, specifically in Petrzalka, where there are almost 300 heroin dealers; the number of addicts can only be estimated. Altogether, 16,817 patients, of whom 15,025 are alcoholics, 1,532 are drug addicts over age 18, and 255 are drug addicts unde age 18, were registered with the Drug Dependency Treatment Center (CLDZ) in Bratislava. This year alone, 445 new addicts over age 18 and 123 under age 18 have been accepted for treatment. Some 2,567 people dependent on drugs were registered and treated throughout Slovakia in 1993; in the case of heroin, this involves a 437-percent increase compared with 1992. According to Dr. Chaban, this is merely the tip of the iceberg; it would be necessary to multiply the statistical figure by 12 to gain a real estimate of the number of drug addicts in Slovakia. Heroin is still the most popular drug. Cocaine is considered to be a well-known weekend drug for intellectuals; no one has been registered with this dependency. Apparently, the police have not confirmed the reports that heroin powder is being added to raspberry syrups at discos in the Boccacio Club in Petrzalka. SME also received a negative response to its question on whether they know about the stickers and tattoos laced with heroin being sold in Petrzalka.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

### Foreign Envoys on Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty

*LD2610221794 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The peace treaty between Jordan and Israel was not received with undivided enthusiasm in the Arab countries. Syrian President al-Asad called the agreement signed today a separate peace. It is considered in Damascus that Jordan has violated an earlier agreement of the Arab countries. [passage omitted] We asked the opinion of Arab diplomats in Budapest.

[Unidentified correspondent] According to (?Bakkar Agdic), the charge d'affaires ad interim of the Syrian Embassy, Jordan has violated the Madrid Agreement, which says that the Arab countries coordinate their stances about the method of reconciliation with Israel and they demand Israel withdraw its troops from the territories occupied since 1967.

According to Bakkar Agdic, Syria is not against the agreement, it is only against its method.

[Begin Bakkar Agdic recording, in Arabic with Hungarian subtitles, processed from Arabic, broadcast in progress] ...this will put the Arab countries into a strong and united position. However, when it leaves this coordination and concludes separate and sudden agreements individually, this will weaken the Arab position in the negotiations. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The representative of Syria, accompanied by eight Arab diplomats, met Zoltan Gal, speaker of the National Assembly for coffee. Bakkar Agdic gave a reply worthy of a diplomat to the question as to whether Syria was ready for a peace agreement.

[Begin Agdic recording] We are very keen on achieving it, and at the earliest opportunity.

[Correspondent] According to Murad al-Din Jawdat, ambassador of Lebanon [name and title as received], it is difficult to talk about a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon while Israeli troops remain stationed in Southern Lebanon.

[Begin Murad al-Din Jawdat recording, in French with Hungarian subtitles, processed from French, broadcast in progress] ...demand from Israel to evacuate unconditionally its troops from Southern Lebanon. The presence of foreign Israeli troops in Southern Lebanon does not, at this time, encourage any movement toward real cooperation in the region.

[Correspondent] At today's Hungarian-Arab diplomatic meeting, the Palestinian ambassador did not take part. We were told at the embassy that although they had received an invitation, the ambassador was abroad. Those who stayed at the embassy did not wish to comment on the peace treaty.

[Announcer] The guest of Newsreel is Mr. Yo'el Alon, Israel's ambassador in Budapest. Good evening.

Mr. Ambassador, in the past 30 years Israel successfully resisted talks, as it were, with all of the Arab partners, or being drawn into negotiations. Well, after the third peace agreement, do you see any chance for Syria and Lebanon also becoming part of the settlement process.

[Alon, in Hungarian] I do not just see a chance, but I am totally convinced that Syria and Lebanon will also become part of this peace process soon. In order for this to happen, the two parties have to sit down at the negotiating table. We have already done this. One party must not tell the other to do something without condition, but peace has to be strived for mutually.

[Announcer] Ambassador, do you agree that now, after agreeme[illegible] have been signed with Egypt, the Palestinians, and now with Jordan, the danger of Israel being annihilated has somewhat diminished, since this was always the excuse earlier on.

[Alon] Well, this was not an excuse. We always tried to achieve peace with our neighbors and we knew that we could mainly count on ourselves. Naturally, now, after the third peace treaty, we hope that we will be able to cooperate with these Arab states and peoples in order that the other neighboring countries and other Arab states be drawn into the final peace negotiations.

[Announcer] What sort of concessions is Israel willing to make if Lebanon and Syria joined the peace negotiation?

[Alon] We have said this many times that Israel is willing to negotiate, just the same as we negotiated and achieved peace with Jordan too, without conditions. [passage omitted] If we manage to achieve a situation when our security is guaranteed, negotiations could also be carried out about the territorial questions. This is what happened with Jordan and Egypt, and we achieved peace.

[Announcer] Mr. Ambassador, thank you.

### Defense Official on Reorganizing Security Tasks

*AU2610122794 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Oct 94 p 4*

[Unattributed report on interview with Defense Ministry State Secretary Jozsef Feher; place and date not given: "The Military Security Office Could Even Hold the Minister Under Surveillance"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti recently announced that he wants to reorganize the activity of the Military Security Office [KBH] with two internal orders, thus filling the legal gaps that led to the questioning of the legality of several security investigations in the past. One of these orders clearly defines the circle of positions that involve possession of important secrets and, thus, the KBH can conduct security investigations on the persons in such positions without any preliminary announcement or any special suspicion.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Jozsef Feher pointed out that the task of the KBH is to protect individuals in important positions without their knowledge, precisely in order to avoid the "entanglement" of these persons. These persons possess a large amount of state secrets and, in the course of a possible provocation, the state secret could be harmed through them.

People in sensitive positions will sign a statement in the coming days in which they acknowledge these investigations. The statement will be valid as long as the protected person fills the relevant position. Of course, there are positions and areas, like the military units and the entire area of secret service where, irrespective of their ranks and positions, the officers work with a large number of secret data. The new ministerial orders will probably affect several hundred professional officers.

Jozsef Feher pointed out that, in addition to investigating the people in sensitive positions, the KBH must take action in every case that could threaten our national security interests. The law stipulates penal factors under the jurisdiction of the KBH, like the violation of state secrets.

Asked whether the KBH is authorized to even place the heads of the Defense Ministry under surveillance if under suspicion, Jozsef Feher said that the law does not differentiate between Hungarian citizens. In case of suspicion or possibility of crimes, like the violation of state secrets, the KBH can even place the defense minister under surveillance without his knowledge. [passage omitted]

### Finance Minister Cited on State of Economy

*LD2610152294 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The economic balance in our country is deteriorating further. The current balance of payments deficit is expected to reach $3.5 billion by the end of the year. Speaking at an economics conference in Budapest, Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi said that there are positive changes too, but that these are not enough. The government wants to create the foundations for lasting economic growth by increasing the proportion of investments, while consumption by the population must decrease.

The transformation of the system of early retirement, of the sick-pay system, and of provisions for the unemployed must be started next year. Changes are necessary in the allocation of family allowances, in help with the cost of medicines, as well as in the financing of higher education, the finance minister said.

### PRC Official Interviewed on Visit, Taiwan Issue

*AU2610122394 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Oct 94 p 3*

[Interview with Qian Zhengying, deputy chairman of the PRC People's Political Consultative Conference, by Peter Dunai in Budapest; date not given: "Deng's Departure Would Not Change the Politics—The Chinese Leader Is Healthy, Qian Zhengying Tells NEPSZABADSAG"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Deng Xiaoping enjoys an excellent state of health at the moment, but even his departure from life would not change the political line, Qian Zhengying, deputy chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, told NEPSZABADSAG.*

[Qian] Deng drew up the current line; he can be seen as the main constructor of our politics, the Chinese type socialism. During the more than one decade, our people have been able to recognize that this road is correct and useful for the people and the country and it corresponds to our given circumstances. The essence of this line is that it focuses on the economy, and it is characterized by reforms in domestic policy and opening in foreign policy. I find it unlikely that anyone will ever change this line and define another instead. In my view, it is a nonexistent problem whether Deng is alive or not or that anyone can change this policy. In addition to this, our party's central committee, headed by comrade Jiang Zemin, firmly supports this line.

[Dunai] How can the issue of Taiwan be solved?

[Qian] Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese Republic. We most firmly oppose any ideas on having a China and an independent Taiwan. As for the perspectives, my personal view is that unity will sooner or later be established. However, the solution of this issue is part of our country's domestic politics. We would like the two sides to be able to sit down and negotiate; we are also striving for unity to come about in a peaceful way. However, we will not commit ourselves to not using weapons.

[Dunai] Can the return of Hong Kong in 1997 have any influence on settling the issue of Taiwan?

[Qian] It does to the extent that some forces in Taiwan will probably watch very carefully how we implement the politics of "one country, two systems" after the return of Hong Kong. It does not in the sense that we have already very clearly formulated the policy of "one country, two systems," and we will solve the issue of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan in the spirit of this policy. After its return in 1997, Hong Kong's social system and laws will not change. It will be governed by the people of Hong Kong.

[Dunai] What was the goal of your visit to Hungary?

[Qian] The deepening of mutual understanding, exchange of views, and drawing up the methods of cooperation. We met representatives of the Industry and Trade Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and parliament, but we only discussed the frameworks and did not go into concrete details.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

### Foreign Affairs Minister Submits Resignation

*LD2710133494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski has submitted his resignation. At a news conference, he said that the reason for his decision was the fact that his name was included on the list of people who had broken the anticorruption law. The list was revealed by Justice Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz yesterday.

[Correspondent Andrzej Jelenski] Exactly half an hour ago, Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski, at a news conference that was organized in a hurry, made a statement to the press by reading out a brief note saying that he had decided to resign from the post of head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He explained his decision by the fact that yesterday Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, minister of justice and prosecutor general, accused him of being a member of the supervisory board of the Polish Savings Bank.

What are the implications of the minister's decision, and will the resignation be accepted? All signs are that Prime Minister Pawlak will not accept the resignation. However, if the decision on Mr. Andrzej Olechowski's resignation is accepted, this will be the first signal of the collapse of Prime Minster Pawlak's cabinet.

### Olechowski Issues Statement

*LD2710151994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1433 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 27 Oct—The following is the full text of Minister Olechowski's statement:

"1. In the Sejm yesterday, the prosecutor general, with the knowledge of the prime minister, questioned my honesty and accused me of being in conflict with the law. In this situation I have decided to resign from the post of foreign minister.

"2. I state that my conscience is clear. I earn my money honestly, by hard work, which is real, not fictitious, and in accordance with the law.

"3. The law, to which the prosecutor general made reference, bans the earning of two salaries for holding two or more public posts. Membership on a supervisory board is not a public post but constitutes work for a company.

"4. The prosecutor general provided a different interpretation of the law and on that basis voiced his accusations against specific people. In a law abiding state it is not the prosecutor general who interprets the regulations. In a law abiding state the justice minister does not initiate discussion on the interpretation of the law by publicly accusing specific people, but closes such discussion.

"5. I do not know the motives behind the prosecutor general's actions. Unfortunately, good will, respect for the law-abiding state, and trust in the personal honesty of people under scrutiny were not among those motives.

"6. I hold personal honesty in the highest esteem both in my personal and in my public life. I cannot agree to my honesty being questioned. I believe that it is necessary that this matter be clarified by a court of law."

### Justice Minister Cimoszewicz Addresses Sejm

*LD2610231394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1501 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[Speech by Polish Justice Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz to the Sejm on 26 October—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Deputy Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych] Now we will move to Point 15 on the agenda: a report by the minister of justice on the clean-hands operation he has conducted. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and the minister of justice, will now take the floor.

[Cimoszewicz] Mr. Speaker, Mr. President. May it please the House! Two years ago, a law was passed that was aimed at limiting the economic activity of people holding public posts. The law covered people holding leading administrative posts in the state, as well as employees of state offices, both central and provincial, of the Supreme Chamber of Control, of state banks, certain local government employees, and people employed in the management of state enterprises and joint-stock companies where the State Treasury owns more than 50 percent of the shares. The law also contains regulations concerning Sejm deputies and senators and people who are members of parish bodies. The law defines various restrictions and bans that differ for various categories of public post. [passage omitted]

Now, two years after the law was implemented, it is necessary, I believe, to review in a comprehensive manner whether the regulations of the law are being adhered to, both as regards the restrictions and activities banned in this law and the procedure for monitoring the law. According to the Prosecutor's Office, such an operation had not been undertaken before, and any delay was therefore undesirable. [passage omitted]

I asked for information to be made available by 15 October. So far, I have not received a reply to my letter from the minister of national defense, the minister of foreign economic cooperation, the minister of town and country planning, and the minister of culture and arts. The president of the National Polish Bank has asked for the deadline to be extended. The heads of other high or central offices notified me that the inspection had not been completed in their institutions. For example, the minister of internal affairs had not completed the inspection at the UOP [State Protection Office], the Border Guards, and the Fire-Fighting Services. The same goes for the chairman of the Academic Research Committee and the chairman of the Physical Culture and Tourism

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Office, or the information made available is still incomplete, if not to say laconic, as is the case with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [passage omitted]

It is worth pointing out here the scale of the inspection that is still in progress. Altogether, the continuing operation applies to several thousand people employed in government administration, local government, state enterprises, and other entities mentioned in the 1992 law. [passage omitted]

The findings so far reveal that the scale of glaring transgressions of the anticorruption law is not very large. We have found that the regulations envisaged by the law were broken in 21 cases, which included 15 employees of central institutions and six of local administration. The people in question held posts in the management of joint-stock companies in which the State Treasury did not own shares, performed other functions in those companies, or were members of the board of foundations conducting economic activity. The election or appointment of such people to these posts is, according to the law, void. In these cases, prosecutors will approach the registration courts and instruct them that such people be struck from the commercial register, wherever they have been named as members of management.

The superiors of the people involved should also, if they have not done it yet, embark on appropriate professional proceedings. If this is not carried out, prosecutors will file appropriate motions.

In 46 cases, further investigation will be carried out, aimed at reaching a final assessment on whether the economic activity conducted by the people involved can be considered in breach of the regulations of the 1992 law. This figure can, of course, be increased as the operation progresses and may also include local government officials and members of state-owned enterprises. [passage omitted]

A separate problem is very widespread participation of people holding leading posts in the country or other managerial posts in state offices, as well as people employed by the local government bodies, state enterprises, and other organizational units, both currently and in the past, in the authorities of joint-stock companies co-owned by the State Treasury. They, as a rule, receive salaries and have been appointed by economic entities eligible to do this. The holding of such posts is not in breach of the anticorruption law. For this reason, accusations voiced in public that the law of 1992 has been breached in those cases are unfounded, regardless of who is making these accusations.

From information available to us, it transpires that 57 persons who are now holding leading state posts either were or still are representatives of the State Treasury in joint-stock companies co-owned by the State Treasury. This concerns, among others, two ministers—in addition, one minister held such a post until June of this year—five secretaries of state, 38 under secretaries of state or people holding similar posts, and 11 directors-general. The employment in joint-stock companies is salaried. The salary bracket is from 2 million to 5 million zlotys [Z] per month, but, in nine cases, the salaries exceeded Z10 million. In several cases, we failed to obtain appropriate information. [passage omitted]

From the information we have managed to obtain, it transpires that, in the past, 10 persons were employed by joint-stock companies, including one minister, two secretaries of state, five under secretaries, and two directors-general. Once more I want to emphasize that the information that has been made available to us is incomplete.

From the information sent from the ministries and central institutions, it has been possible to establish that altogether 442 persons are employed in joint-stock companies co-owned by the State Treasury. [passage omitted] This figure includes 76 directors of ministerial departments, five members of the Board of the National Polish Bank, six chief accountants, 91 deputy directors of departments, 45 advisers to ministers, 34 heads of sections, 166 chief experts, and 19 directors of provincial branches. [passage omitted]

The salaries received by employees of state offices for holding management posts in joint-stock companies amounted in most cases to approximately Z10 million per month. Some people held management posts in several joint-stock companies, and their incomes amounted to more than Z10 million.

The following are some extreme cases. A director of a department in the Privatization Ministry received a gross payment of about Z450 million for a period of two years. A member of the board of the National Polish Bank received a total of about Z430 million gross for three years. An under secretary of state in the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation received the total gross amount of about Z450 million for two years. The minister of transport and maritime economy received a total amount of Z386 million gross for a period of two years. Another member of the National Bank of Poland board received a gross amount of about Z340 million for two years. The chief expert at the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation was receiving a total amount of over Z20 million per month from several companies. [passage omitted]

The law of 31 July 1981 envisages—I quote—that a person who holds a high-ranking state post and who, at the same time, holds another post elsewhere is entitled to only one salary, chosen by that person. This regulation has been interpreted differently. For example, the legal office of the Presidential Chancellery decided that this law concerned only a situation in which a high-ranking state post was combined with another public office post. According to the Prosecutor's Office, this interpretation is wrong and is closer to creating legislation than interpreting the law. The law does not contain any basis for

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

such an interpretation. On the contrary, it envisages only one exception from the general law: academic work. [passage omitted]

The law of 1992, while allowing the representation of the interests of the State Treasury by people holding high-ranking state posts, does not contain any regulation contradicting the above-mentioned law. Consequently, the fact that additional salary was received and, to be more precise, that the people involved did not choose one salary, is in breach of Article 4, Paragraph 2, of the Law on Salaries to be paid to people in high-ranking state posts. The law does not specify any sanctions if these regulations are breached, but it is obvious that they have to be adhered to. One should expect that the people involved will react in an appropriate way to this statement. Some people have already paid back the salaries received or have declared their readiness to do this. Information on this subject and the other findings of the Prosecutor's Office will be passed on to the Council of Ministers. [passage omitted]

One should seriously think about a further restriction or even a ban on economic activity by people holding public posts. One should introduce a ban on employment or performing other paid functions in companies and foundations. [passage omitted]

We believe that Sejm deputies and senators should not be involved in economic activity. State employees should only be able to undertake academic and teaching activity. An important factor that would make these proposals realistic would be to ensure a sufficient level of income for state employees.

In addition to this report, I will now pass to the speaker documents containing the names of people who, according to the Prosecutor's Office, breached the regulations of the laws of 1992 and 1981. Thank you very much. [brief applause]

## Mazowiecki Urges Tougher International Action

*BR2510135394 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 22 Oct 94 p 18*

[Interview with former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN rapporteur on human rights in the former Yugoslavia, by Fabio Luppino in Gallarate, Italy; date not given: "The Bosnian Wound Is Rending Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"No description can fully express the immensity of the suffering caused by the violations of fundamental human rights perpetrated in various regions of the former Yugoslavia." These are the bitter words of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the former Polish prime minister, who has been endeavoring for two years to throw light on what has been happening in that ravaged land. As the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, he was the most eagerly awaited participant in the first day of the conference on "ethnic peace" organized by the Jacques Maritain International Institute in Gallarate [near Milan]. "The political will to undertake determined initiatives to force the war, the assaults, and the human rights violations to stop has petered out in Europe and America," said Mazowiecki. "The division of Europe cannot be healed after the fall of communism as long as Bosnia continues to bleed at its center and the threat of a widening of the conflict continues to hang over it."*

*Evidence will be drawn from the Mazowiecki reports for submission to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, where the war criminals from the former Yugoslavia are to be tried.*

[Luppino] What do you think of the work of the International Court of Justice in The Hague?

[Mazowiecki] The first trials are about to begin. I was skeptical initially. As long as the war in Bosnia continues, it cannot operate. It cannot be compared with the Nuremberg court because the latter did not have full powers until the end of the war. But I have changed my mind following my latest visit to central Bosnia, where I realized that the war criminal problem has to be solved if the various ethnic groups are to live side by side. They must be tried.

[Luppino] The United States is pressing for lifting the embargo on arms supplies to the Muslims. Do you not think this would contribute to a return to widespread war?

[Mazowiecki] It will come about in six months, as far as I know. From the moral point of view, the Bosnian Government has the right to call for the embargo to be lifted. If the international community is unable to help the Bosnian people, it cannot prevent it from defending itself. Sure, a decision to this effect could make for an escalation in the war.

[Luppino] You say in all the reports that you have submitted to the United Nations to date that you firmly believe that human rights cannot be defended without the use of force. At this point, do you think the task of the UN forces has become pointless and that NATO intervention is required?

[Mazowiecki] The situation in Bosnia has now reached a deadlock, in which nobody can do anything. There is the "contact group" proposal, which has not been accepted by the Serbs. Force is needed to implement certain decisions that have been made.

[Luppino] What decisions?

[Mazowiecki] It was decided in January that NATO could counterattack to defend Sarajevo, but compliance with this demand was obtained by temperate means. When a decision is made, no one must underrate it the day after. The error lies in this continual uncertainty.

[Luppino] Does the plan for the division of Bosnia drawn up by the "contact group" lay the foundations for peace or presage another war?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Mazowiecki] If it were to be accepted along with international protection for Bosnia and the demilitarization of the whole region, it would be a step on the road to peace. It is the only solution. But implementing these proposals requires determination.

[Luppino] Nevertheless, you have always been against assigning territories conquered by war. This way, the Serbs would obtain what they have taken with massacres and devastation.

[Mazowiecki] Not everything can be put back the way it was. If there were international protection, race relations could settle down in due time. Peace can be achieved only on these conditions.

[Luppino] The only feasibility study, undertaken by the U.S. Department of State three years ago, for intervention in the former Yugoslavia, envisaged that 400,000 men would have to be deployed for a successful intervention, with a 40-percent loss risk. What country in the world would be willing, in your opinion, to send troops only to see almost half of them die?

[Mazowiecki] I am not in favor of intervention at all costs. I am in favor of negotiations, but certain risks have to be assumed in order to achieve results. I will answer your question with another question: Nobody wanted to die for Gdansk in 1939. Would that have been right?

[Luppino] You have visited Bosnia many times to collect evidence on the massacres that have been perpetrated. What has shocked you most? What have you seen that you did not imagine you would see?

[Mazowiecki] There are many things that have shocked me: the camps, the devastation of Mostar, the suffering expressed by the people.

[Luppino] You have made 11 trips to the former Yugoslavia and drawn up 11 reports, but your suggestions have not been taken up. Is it true that you have even considered resigning?

[Mazowiecki] It is true, I have thought about it. The only thing that has prevented me is my undying memory of what the people down there have said to me: They have told me to tell the international organizations the truth.

[Luppino] Do you trust [Serbian President] Milosevic now, or do you think he has changed his tack just to get around the economic sanctions?

[Mazowiecki] He is an intelligent politician, who has now made controversial decisions that have been contested by [Bosnian Serb leader] Karadzic. We must wait and see whether he will really do what he has promised to do.

[Luppino] Who bears the main responsibility for the ethnic cleansing? Are there innocent parties in Bosnia?

[Mazowiecki] It has been pursued by the Serbs on a larger scale, although the reality is more complex. The bishop of Banja Luka has been unable to come to Italy because instances of ethnic cleansing similar to those of the summer of 1992 are recurring there. The longer this war goes on, the more unacceptable the methods adopted by the warring factions will become.

## Poll Shows Less Trust in Walesa, Pawlak

*WS2710115594 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 27 Oct 94 p 2*

[Report by NIKA: "CBOS: Trust in Prime Minister and President Falls"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most popular politician in October is Jacek Kuron, who has won the confidence of 72 percent of Poles. Second place is occupied by Waldemar Pawlak, who, at the same time, has lost the greatest number of sympathizers this month (as recently as September he was trusted by 70 percent of respondents, whereas that percentage has now decreased to 62). In addition, the percentage of people who view the prime minister negatively rose the most (from 14 to 21 percent).

The rating of Lech Walesa did not deteriorate that much. He is, however, the politician who is distrusted the most on the ranking list. Right now, 31 percent of respondents declare that they trust the president; a month ago it was 36 percent. This does not mean, however, that the number of his opponents has increased; 48 percent declare that they distrust the president (in September it was 47 percent).

Walesa has more supporters than opponents among such groups as people with right-wing views (49 percent of people from this group trust him, and 34 percent declare distrust toward him), elderly people (39 and 38 percent, respectively), and very religious people (43 and 40 percent, respectively).

Sympathy toward Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Grzegorz Kolodko increased the most. Right now every second Pole sympathizes with the Freedom Union politician (in September it was 45 percent). In just one month, the percentage of people who are unfavorably disposed toward him dropped from 35 to 30.

Grzegorz Kolodko is rather a controversial personality; even though 36 percent of respondents declare that they trust him, which is more than in September (30 percent), there are now 4 percent more people who disapprove of the deputy prime minister's activities.

The Public Opinion Research Center conducted the poll between 6 and 10 October on a random sample of 1,184 people.

## Battle in PdP Over Talks With Right-Wing

*WS2710111394 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Oct 94 p 2*

[Article by M.D.Z.: "ZChN and PL Against PC and KK; Battle Over 'Covenant for Poland' Name"]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[FBIS Translated Text] Leaders of the Christian-National Union [ZChN] and the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Accord [PL] fear that the Center Accord [PC] and the Conservative Coalition [KK] will want to split the Covenant for Poland [PdP] and take over the name of the coalition. An occasion to do this would be the conflict over the participation of the Movement for the Republic [RdR] and Romuald Szeremietiew in the alliance. ZChN and PL leaders do not intend to agree to that and are getting ready for a counteraction.

"The ZChN and the PL submitted to PdP Chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski (who will fulfill this function until 1 December) a motion on Tuesday requesting a convention of the PdP National Council as soon as possible to discuss the crisis within the coalition," RZECZPOSPOLITA learned from acting ZChN President Ryszard Czarnecki. The session will be held late next week. Participating in the meeting will also be RdR representatives, which Kaczynski has recently not been inviting to meetings of the PdP leadership. ZChN and PL politicians, backed by the RdR, will want the council to adopt a resolution obliging the PdP leadership to hold talks with the other rightist bloc—Accord of 11 November (so far the negotiations have been blocked by the PC and the KK, which are in conflict with the Union for Real Politics [UPR], part of the Accord of 11 November.)

As we have learned, relations among the competing parties within the PdP are becoming increasingly strained. When they invite one another to meetings, the coalition leaders request that the invitation be confirmed by a signature on the actual invitation.

"Unless Kaczynski accepts and implements the program approved by the majority, he will be free to leave the coalition," RZECZPOSPOLITA was told by a politician of one of the parties that is in favor of holding talks with UPR as soon as possible. "Then the name of the PdP will belong to those groupings that support the idea of forming a broad alliance of the right wing."

### Poll on Responsibility for Inflation Rate

*WS2710112394 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Oct 94 pp 1, 7*

[Article by "P.J.": "Who Is Responsible for Inflation?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems there is an increasing tendency among Poles to claim that high inflation is one of the major factors hindering the economic growth of our country. Opinions still differ, however, as to who has the greatest influence on the inflation rate.

According to opinion polls conducted in mid-September for RZECZPOSPOLITA by the Social Research Laboratory [PBS] from Sopot, one-quarter of Polish citizens believe that the government has the greatest influence on the inflation rate. Nearly as many Poles (24 percent) have no opinion. When similar polls were conducted in January 1993, only five respondents out of a total of 1,032 were unable to answer the question of who has the greatest influence on inflation. This demonstrates that, as our economy develops, we learn more about its dynamics and mechanisms.

Only one in five respondents (19 percent) believes that the National Bank of Poland [NBP] has decisive influence on the rate of inflation. Even fewer people, a mere 6 percent, subscribe to the view that inflation depends primarily on the Sejm, which passes the budget and approves NBP monetary policy projections. The IMF is seen as having more influence on the inflation rate than the Sejm. Of those people polled, 11 percent believe that the IMF decides the actual inflation rate in our country. Almost as many respondents (10 percent) claim that inflation depends most of all on prices set by enterprises for their products. There is little support for theories that inflation depends on the citizens themselves (3 percent) or on the president (2 percent).

Projections for the inflation rate and the factors that shape it have a huge impact on the national economy. They influence, for example, how people save and how enterprises make a number of important economic decisions. When assessing institutions that influence the inflation rate, the stability of anti-inflationary policies is also evaluated.

It is generally known that the Sejm's term in office is four years and the NBP president's six years, and the government may be changed if, for example, a train carrying deputies is late.

It seems that the attitudes of management staff workers have the greatest influence on the economy. Their opinions on institutions having the most influence on the inflation rate differ considerably from those of the rest of society. Nearly one third (29 percent) of them claim that the greatest influence on inflation is exerted by the NBP; 16 percent think it is by the government, and 13 percent by the IMF. Only 15 percent of respondents within this group do not have an opinion as to who has the greatest impact on inflation.

Analyzing the dependency between opinions on factors shaping inflation and income levels, it becomes clear that the higher a respondent's income, the more frequent the opinion that the NBP has the most influence on inflation. Only 12 percent of respondents with the lowest incomes claim likewise, as compared with 26 percent of people in the highest income group, earning over 3 million zlotys per household member [time frame not specified]. Higher incomes are also closely related to interest in moves made by enterprises. People within the higher income group tend to attribute less meaning to government decisions, although, in this case, differences between the richest and the poorest are not as striking as in the case of opinions on the NBP's role in controlling inflation.

It is interesting that as much as 31 percent of all women do not have opinions on institutions responsible for the inflation rate. Only 18 percent of men declared that they had no opinion. It is also worth noting that opinions on the decisive role of the government depend on the size of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the town in which a respondent lives. In large cities with over 200,000 residents, only 19 percent of respondents claim that the government has an influence on the inflation rate. In small towns (population below 50,000), 26 percent of respondents claim likewise, and, in the countryside, as much as 29 percent.

A similar poll was conducted 20 months ago, in January 1993. Nearly one-half (45 percent) of respondents then claimed that the government was primarily responsible for inflation. More people (15 percent) pointed to the important role played by the IMF. Only 10 percent of Poles saw the NBP role as meaningful.

The poll was conducted by the PBS from Sopot on 17-18 September 1994, on a representative sample of 1,040 adult Poles.

**Who do you believe has the greatest impact on the inflation rate?**

| | Jan 93 | Sep 94 |
|---|---|---|
| | Percent | |
| Government | 45 | 25 |
| IMF | 15 | 11 |
| Sejm | 12 | 6 |
| Enterprises | 11 | 10 |
| NBP | 10 | 19 |
| Citizens | 5 | 3 |
| President | 2 | 2 |
| Difficult to say | 0 | 24 |

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

### Council of Europe Official Visits Bucharest

*AU2610184994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Information and Documentation Center of the Council of Europe was inaugurated today in Bucharest. The ceremony was attended by Romanian President Ion Iliescu; Daniel Tarchys, secretary general of the Council of Europe; Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu; Romanian political figures; and high-ranking Council of Europe officials.

In his speech, the Romanian foreign minister said that this moment has a manifold significance, since it can be considered an important step in Romanian cooperation with the Council of Europe, thus confirming our country's firm decision to integrate itself into the active dynamics of this international body.

Tarchys, in turn, said that the inauguration of the Information and Documentation Center will further boost Romanian activity in its cooperation with the Council of Europe. The Center also marks the determination of this international body to intensify ties with the new democracies in central and eastern Europe, thus contributing to security and stability in the European space.

Afterward, President Iliescu said in a press statement that the opening of the center is a further step toward Romanian integration into European institutions and the Council of Europe in particular, of which it has been a full member since October 1993. He added that this was proof of Romania's opening up to European institutions.

The secretary general of the Council of Europe and the minister of foreign affairs also participated in a meeting with journalists during which they expressed satisfaction with the results of the Tarchys visit.

### Iliescu, Tarchys Examine Ties

*AU2610185194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Romanian President Ion Iliescu today received Daniel Tarchys, secretary general of the Council of Europe. During the talks, both sides expressed satisfaction with the active nature of Romania's relations with the Council of Europe, illustrated by the opening today of the Information and Documentation Center; the seminar on the democratization of local administration, which will open shortly; and the permanent dialogue between Romanian officials and the representatives of the Council of Europe at various levels—said Presidential Spokesman Traian Chebeleu to the press after the meeting.

Chebeleu also said that the guest recalled the problems raised by the enlargement of the Council of Europe and stressed the need to redimension the Council's new activities. Referring to the issue of Russia, President Ion Iliescu said that it is both in the interest of Russia and of the Council of Europe member countries to promote Russia's integration into the Council of Europe.

The exchange of views continued at a working lunch after the meeting, attended by Chamber of Deputies Speaker Adrian Nastase; Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Melescanu; and Senator Florin Radulescu-Botica, head of the Romanian parliamentary delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

### UN Confirms 'Significant' Gains by Bosnian Army

*AU2710093994 Paris AFP in English 0848 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 27 (AFP)—Government forces have broken out of the western Bosnian enclave of Bihac, putting Serb forces to flight, a UN spokesman said Thursday.

The Mosiem-led army Wednesday pushed back Serb forces to the east and southeast of Bihac town and "appear to have captured a significant amount of territory," the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) spokesman said here. Serb forces appeared to have been caught off guard and had abandoned much of their equipment in their retreat, the spokesman added.

Wednesday night the area appeared to have quietened down, he said. On Wednesday UNPROFOR spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Spicer said government forces had captured an important Serb stronghold, some 5 kilometers (3 miles) east of Bihac town, seizing barracks at Zalozje from where the Serbs had been raining mortar shells on the city.

The Bosnian Army command said its forces had "liberated the Grabez plateau", to the immediate east of Bihac town and were moving on Bosanska Krupa. The Bihac pocket, an enclave on the border with Croatia, has been cut off from the rest of the Bosnian federation since the beginning of the war 30 months ago.

### Dudakovic on 'Crushed' Serbs

*AU2610154794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[Statement by Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint forces of the 5th Corps yesterday launched an attack under the name of Grmec '94 on the Grabez and Srbljanski plateaus. By this evening, the Grabez Plateau has been completely liberated, as well as a large part of the Srbljanski Plateau. The 5th Corps units have captured Grmusa, and have reached the Drenov Lijes-Pritoka line.

Citizens of Bihac, you are finally rid of constant shelling, sniper fire, and other tortures inflicted by the Serbian-chetnik aggressor in this region. Bihac is finally free after two years of everyday uncertainty. The sons of our Krajina have finally rid themselves of one evil, one symbol of the prison of Serbianhood in this region.

A large amount of equipment has been captured. The chetniks have suffered their worst defeat yet, and our folk song has been proven right again—the 5th Corps is the heavenly force. Beyond all expectations, in a powerful attack the units of the 5th Corps have crushed three chetnik brigades in the region and inflicted enormous losses on the chetniks. Many innocent souls have thus been avenged, and the evil hanging over us forever destroyed.

### Corps Advance Continues

*AU2610150494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, in powerful counterattacks, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps—the heavenly force—continued to expand the free territory of the Bihac region. Pritoka, Golubic, Ripac are again in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as are the chetnik artillery strongholds of Tihotina, (?Pritraski Grabez), (?Dobovska Brda), (?Jeleca Greda), Gorjevac, they have all been captured, and the 5th Corps fighters are in control of these areas now.

In the other direction, the entire Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau has been liberated—(?Livan), Kurtovici, Veliki Radic, Grmusa, all these are former chetnik strongholds. The members of the 5th Corps are about to enter Bosanska Krupa, and some units are already in town. The first telephone calls have been made at the local post office. Krupa na Uni [Bosanska Krupa] was obviously short-lived, and now Bosanska Krupa can breathe with full lungs, with the lungs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the heroes of the 5th Corps advance relentlessly onward.

A few details to illustrate today's successes—several tanks, several self-propelled guns, even combat armored vehicles, dozens of mortars of all calibers, ammunition, equipment, and much more has been captured, including Zis 57-mm antitank guns, and Praga antiaircraft guns. These are all now in the warehouses of the 5th Corps. Over 120 square km have been liberated. The road to Bosanski Petrovac is now open. The units of the 5th Corps, led by Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic are advancing relentlessly onward.

### 'Several' Tanks Captured

*AU2610125394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[Report by Muhamed Mujic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Besides the previously liberated territories of Grabez [word indistinct] Tihotina, Pritoka, and Ripanj, the heroes of the 5th Corps have in their unstoppable onslaught broken out of (?Gorjevac) toward Bosanski Petrovac. At the same time, Golubic Selo on the left bank of the Una River, from which the chetniks expelled Muslims and Croats at the beginning of the war and set most of its households in flames, has been liberated, too.

Brave soldiers under the legendary commander General Atif Dudakovic have captured enormous quantities of various ammunition and shells in their heroic battles.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Besides 30 mortars and 10 guns of various calibers, several tanks and armored personnel carriers in perfectly good order have fallen into the hands of the 5th Corps. That is how the heroes of the 5th Corps fight, and that is how one should fight for Bosna-Herzegovina.

However, this is not all, as the free territory and the ante are expanding hourly.

### General Staff Statement

*AU2610135694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[Statement by Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recent successes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units in the battles on all Bosnia-Herzegovina battlefields speak of constant improvement of [word indistinct] and development of new qualities by the Army.

[Words indistinct] strategically balanced [word indistinct] at the beginning of this year, the Army has taken the actual initiative on most of the battlefields that it continues to maintain. The result of this initiative is the liberation of approximately 1,300 square km of territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The liberated territories are situated along the basic strategic and operational directions of activity of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and represent a sound territorial basis for [word indistinct] the strategic goals.

These considerable military successes have been accomplished in combat and through combat activities of a defensive nature—because (?they are being carried out) on the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory—but are in the manner of their execution offensive, as they are usually undertaken following the aggressor's offensives. In this way, the Army units—even though considerably limited by the lack of heavy arms, bearing in mind that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is the only one being affected by the arms embargo—have moved into the second, liberating phase of the war for defense and preservation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Qualitative organizational preparation, the increased level of training of soldiers and units, and the economical use of available resources have greatly compensated for the artificially created imbalance in armament that continues to reflect on the [word indistinct] of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

It is particularly significant that these military results are being achieved continuously. They, thus, confirm the strength of the Army, which has grown into a military power capable of achieving the greatest of victories. The perspective of Bosnia-Herzegovina's liberation is no longer an illusion but a realistic and achievable goal of our liberation war. The correctness of a policy to rely on our own forces as [word indistinct] and the most efficient way toward freedom and peace has once again been confirmed.

The General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army thanks the soldiers and the officers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army for the bravery, self-sacrifice, and patriotism demonstrated so far and for everything that they have accomplished in the liberation war so far. They have shown in practice that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is a powerful and organized armed force, capable of fully accomplishing the goals given to it by the highest Bosnia-Herzegovina state officials.

### 7th Corps Reportedly at Kupres 'Doorstep'

*AU2610130594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[Report by the press service of the 7th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the history of the Bosniak war of liberation, 26 October will remain written in bold letters. The 7th Corps is at the doorstep of Kupres today. The [word indistinct] liberated territories are no longer counted here because they are increasing with each moment. No one here is any longer counting km or seized [words indistinct]. Howitzers, mortars, antiaircraft weapons, ammunition, field kitchens, vehicles, and many other goods can only be measured in truckloads. No one is counting the dead chetniks either, and there are soldiers as well as so-called officers. Here, no one bothers counting, but we are definitely advancing.

The 7th Corps is advancing relentlessly and knocking on Kupres' doors. All hitherto [word indistinct] strategies of warfare have flopped in this area. The bravery of soldiers and well-planned and executed actions headed by General Alagic have demonstrated fully the perfection of the new strategy and achievement of successes, even in theoretically impossible conditions. It has transpired that bravery and intelligence can accomplish anything.

The chetnik forces are in total and so far unprecedented disarray. Commanders are fleeing, their injured are not being evacuated, and, in short, each is merely saving his own skin.

### TANJUG Notes Conflict in 7th Corps

*LD2610204194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1936 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct 26 (TANJUG)—Muslim-controlled Zenica Radio on Wednesday said the Bosnian Muslim Army Seventh Corps was likely to disintegrate because of internal disputes.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted the radio as saying that the Seventh Corps had suffered heavy losses in the attacks on the Bosnian Serb town of Kupres in Central Bosnia over the past few days. It said the elite 317th Brigade had already broken up while conflicts were reported in other brigades as well.

Seventh Corps Commander Mehmed Alagic on Tuesday told Zenica Radio there were frequent conflicts between

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the soldiers of the 17th Brigade and other units because they had received hard currency from their relatives abroad and refused to undertake dangerous tasks.

Alagic said the brigade "received 200,000 German marks from Germany and Austria last week, but the money disappeared without trace."

He said he suspected some leading officers of the Seventh Corps were involved.

### Heavy Muslim Artillery Attack on Serb Doboj

*LD2610181094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1752 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 26 (TANJUG)—The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said Bosnian Muslim troops had launched a heavy artillery attack on the northern Bosnian Serb town of Doboj on Wednesday afternoon.

SRNA said sirens had sounded alarm sending the population to shelters.

Bosnian Serb army sources said Muslim forces on Wednesday morning also resumed attacks on Bosnian Serb positions near the town of Brcko, 115 km north-northeast of Sarajevo. The sources said the Bosnian Serbs had returned fire and repelled the attack without suffering any casualties.

The Bosnian Muslim army on Wednesday continued strong artillery attacks on Bosnian Serb positions and settlements around Kupres in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, the sources said.

They said the Muslim army had continued to regroup and bring in fresh troops to Mt. Igman near Sarajevo despite requests by the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) that they leave the demilitarized zone.

The Bosnian Serb army general staff on Wednesday denied the allegation that the Bosnian Serb artillery had on Monday shelled the northern Bosnian town of Orasje and the eastern Croatian town of Zupanja. It said Muslim troops were responsible for the shelling.

SRNA quoted a Bosnian Serb army statement as saying that the Muslim army had launched these attacks and blamed them on the Bosnian Serbs in an attempt to provoke Croatian army's deeper involvement in the war against the Bosnian Serbs.

The statement said the Muslim strategy had resulted in Monday's fierce attack on the Bosnian Serb villages of Obudovac, Batkusa, Zabari and Lepenica in the Sava River valley by joint Bosnian Croat and regular Croatian army units.

The statement also said UNPROFOR had warned the Muslims it would use force against them unless they halted the attacks on Croatian army positions and villages.

It said U.N. observers in the area had asked NATO on Monday to be ready for air stikes.

After massing of Croatian troops was observed on the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the observers asked for the reinforcement of their units, said the source.

### Further Roundup of Regional Combat Reports

*AU2610195794*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1800 GMT on 26 October carries in its regular 34-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the country. Reception is poor.

Sead Suskic reports from Travnik that "today the forces of the 7th Corps captured several strategically important points and approached the temporarily occupied town of Kupres. Thus the tactical conditions have been met for further advances toward complete control of the Kupres plain. Large amounts of military hardware have been seized during these attacks, and dozens upon dozens of chetniks have forever left their bones here. A number of aggressor's soldiers has been captured. The chaos and panic that have spread throughout the aggressor's ranks can be illustrated by the following: Fleeing in total panic, a group of about 30 aggressor's soldiers headed off in the direction of Bugojno. The chetniks are not only losing the war, they seem to have lost their compass, too." He says that "the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] artillery lent full support to our artillery in accomplishing the set tasks, which is a clear step ahead toward a joint state and coexistence of the two peoples."

The studio announcer says that "the greater Gradacac free territory has been targeted by the aggressor's heavy artillery. Over 20 enemy helicopter flights have been registered from Bijeljina and Brcko toward Pelagicevo and Bosanski Samac. The siege of this heroic town has been lifted from the east." He says that "the aggressor has continued to attack Sibovac, Liporasce, and mercilessly pound the defense lines and villages on the western end of the Gradacac front."

Reporting from the Doboj front, Jasmin Puskarevic says that "Klokotnica and Brijesnica have been targeted by 120-mm mortars from Tekucica, and 155-mm howitzers from (?Cesnjar). The chetnik Bofors gun from Tekucica has been keeping the Doboj-Tuzla road under constant fire. According to our reconnaissance units, the aggressor is digging in and reinforcing his defense lines intensively."

In his report from Gracanica, Izudin Durakovic says that "since early morning the chetniks have been attacking the defense lines of the 109th Doboj Brigade with artillery and antiaircraft weapons. At about noon they tried to take advantage of the artillery preparation to attempt an infantry breakthrough toward (Dejanov

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Lazar) and (Hodzica Glavica), but these were successfully repulsed and the chetniks were pushed back to their initial positions. After that howitzers from (Susnjari) and 82-mm mortars from Radici pounded Klokotnica and (Usnici)."

Describing the situation in Sarajevo, the studio announcer says that "the aggressor fired several grenades at the defense lines during the day. From Vrace and Grbavica, they fired with machine guns and small arms," and—citing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps—he says that "the enemy was joined in these activities by the Russian troops of the UN Protection Forces."

### Serbs: Muslims Fail To Withdraw From DMZ

*LD2610155394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1527 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zvornik, Bratunac, 26 Oct (TANJUG)—The Muslim army has not yet withdrawn from the demilitarized zone [DMZ] of Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica, despite UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] attempts to persuade the Muslim units, as they themselves put it, to withdraw, military representatives close to the General Staff of the Army of the Srpska republic told TANJUG today.

According to these sources, this was also discussed yesterday between high-ranking UNPROFOR representatives and the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo. This has obviously not resulted in a positive outcome. [passage omitted]

### Serbs Claim UN Bangladeshi Unit Arming Muslims

*LD2610151694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1354 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Zvornik, Bratunac, 26 Oct (TANJUG)—For several days, units of the 5th Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have been waging a large-scale offensive from the Bihac zone, which is designated as a protected zone, on Serb territory, villages, and defense positions, TANJUG has learned from sources close to the headquarters of the Srpska republic army.

They say that the target of the all-out Muslim artillery and infantry attacks is the Grmusa-Grabez plateau as well as the areas of the Krupa na Una [Bosanska Krupa] and Ribac, which are being pounded by uncontrolled and nonselective artillery fire.

The Serb military sources stress that the Serb civilian population, villages, and residential and economic facilities are coming under constant attacks. These sources add that the Muslim units have managed to push back the Serb forces and take control of some territory on the Grmusa-Grabez plateau.

The sources close to the top brass of the Srpska republic do not mention any potential losses on the Serbian side but they have pointed out that UN military observers and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] have failed to voice one single word of condemnation about this totally unprovoked Muslim attack or react in any other way, although the UN Security Council decided at some point to designate the area as a protected zone.

At the same time they recall a different kind of reaction on the part of international representatives when the Serbs were forced to embark on combat operations in self defense. The Serb military sources note that in such situations they resorted to the combat use of NATO air power against the Serbs even in this area or there were threats of retaliation from the air when Serb forces were being forced to return fire to curb Muslim attacks.

The top-ranking sources in the Srpska republic army point out that now, in the wake of the French "blue beret" contingent's departure from the Cazin area, the approach of the UN peace force has been completely revised.

The Serb military forces drew attention to the fact that the UNPROFOR battalion from Bangladesh, which has replaced the French unit in this area, is providing full logistics support for the 5th Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. This is, they explain, just a smokescreen for regular deliveries of arms, ammunition, and military equipment to units of the 5th Corps.

The unhindered arming of the Muslim army in the entire Bihac area is the real reason behind replacing the French "blue berets" with UNPROFOR units from Islamic countries, something that may result in unforeseeable consequences, the sources close to the top-brass of the army of the Srpska republic caution.

### Croat Leader Assails Silajdzic's Attitude

*LD2610222494 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A session of the Herceg-Bosna Presidential Council was held in Mostar this evening. Milan Vego reports:

[Vego] [Passage omitted] At the request of members of the Presidential Council, President Kresimir Zubak briefed the council on the controversial session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation government, at which Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic—in an arrogant way—refused to place on the agenda the issues concerning the central bank, the appointment of Croatian ministers and deputy ministers, and the appointment of Mile Akmadzic as ambassador to the United States. In this connection President Zubak said that certain issues had previously been agreed. He continued:

[Begin Zubak recording] There is the issue concerning the adoption of the federation's code of practice. It is obvious that the code of practice was not adopted, thus allowing for the premier to behave in such an arrogant

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

and obstinate way. Second, we need to define in principle the competence of ministers without portfolio, in our case that of Stjepo Andric. Third, we need to define the relationship between deputies and ministers, i.e. ministers and their deputies. In those ministries whose ministers are Bosniak Muslims, these ministers treat their deputies as their subordinates. However, when ministers are Croat, the Muslims wish to have an equal status at least. This issue must be resolved.

We also asked for the issue of Mile Akmadzic's appointment to be placed on the agenda. He [Silajdzic] said he had something against Mile Akmadzic, that he was against his appointment, that it was a political issue. As far as he was concerned there were no problems, but it was our fault that we had insufficient cadres. The essence of his conduct is: Whatever we wish to implement, he wants our side to make a concession. He wants to exhaust us. He wants us to debate about every deputy minister for at least a month or two, while what we are seeking is an agreement in principle. For instance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs: If the agreement is three Croats among the top 10 officials, three Croats it will be. If the Education Ministry has one Croat official, one it should be. We want an agreement in principle and only then can we talk about specific names. [end recording]

### Bosnian Serb Leader Views Future Options

*AU2110155694 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 11 Oct 94 pp 4-5*

[Interview with Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Srpska republic, by Drasko Ruzic; place and date not given: "There Is No Peace Without Direct Negotiations"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Ruzic] The Contact Group offered its maps and there followed the well-known rejection of the maps by both the Srpska republic leadership and the people. It came to a rift between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Srpska republic. The Yugoslav authorities imposed sanctions against the people of the Srpska republic. What do you think about the Contact Group maps and the consequence of their rejection—the sanctions imposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

[Koljevic] The decisions made by the Contact Group also meant the beginning of the differences and disputes with the Yugoslav policies and their representatives. There are several circumstances about which the public was not sufficiently informed. The first circumstance that in my opinion is very negative is that we were not at all informed about the status of the Contact Group. Once when it was established we received information from Lord Owen that it was a group of experts who would study geographical details, which the ministers cannot and were not prepared to do, so that a just solution can be reached. In the first negotiations with the Contact Group we did not get any back information on our strategic interests, which were later not respected.

Neither were we informed of the fact that the Contact Group represented five different governments. Later on, in every meeting of foreign ministers, we realized that they accepted everything done by the Contact Group. This means that the Contact Group had far wider powers than we had been told. The other negative circumstance in connection with the Contact Group is that they made political guesses without the parties concerned, they traded, so to say, without taking into account the balance of the strategic interests of the warring factions.

I would like to mention just one drastic example. Access to the sea was understandably a very important issue for the Muslim authorities, and we understand this. Especially sensitive was the issue of Neum, since the problem is in fact whether Croatian territory will remain compact or not. As far as the issue of Brcko and the access to the Sava River are concerned, every objective observer must know that the question of that territory is far more important for the Srpska republic. The Sava River is navigable in the direction of Belgrade, the capital of the Serbs, but there is no reason for it not to be a communication for the federation, that is for the Muslim side, too, if peace is reached.

It is clear that the Sava does not flow in the right direction for the Muslims if there is war. This example shows that the plan was unsuitable, but a much more severe and rude definition could be used, too.

I would like to comment on the second part of your question. Pressure was exerted on Yugoslavia for a very long time since it was unjustifiably accused of participation in the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. After it had been decided to give the Bosnian Serbs 49 percent of the territory, it was concluded at the highest level in Yugoslavia that that was more or less all right. The most important reason for this misunderstanding is the poor level of knowledge of our geography and economic resources. Yugoslavia offered that percentage because of the heavy burden of the sanctions, for which reason it also decided not to support the Srpska republic any longer. We, those directly responsible for the Serbian people, who have suffered so much and achieved military victories in the last two and a half years, decided to hold a referendum. We did not want a quarrel. Let me quote Mr. Radovan Karadzic who said: "There must be two for a quarrel." This was our basic attitude. Nobody will succeed in splitting us, in spite of the price we have to pay for it now. I think that the political campaign lead against us, especially against the Bosnian Serb leaders, cannot have long-term effects, it will be wiped out by facts that will gradually come to light—beginning with the political will of all the Serbs who live in this territory to the fact that the Contact Group plan is unjust. Knowing what is going on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the moment I think that this conflict will slowly fade away.

[Ruzic] The Belgrade press, NIN in the first place, has been claiming for a long time that you will succeed Mr.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Karadzic in the position of Srpska republic president. These headlines appeared in the Yugoslav press just before Yugoslavia introduced sanctions against the Srpska republic. Are these claims true?

[Koljevic] It is not at all true, but it is true that persons behind such ideas harm the Serbian people on both sides of the Drina River. The Serbian people have to know that this is not true, which is proven by the things we have done together since these attempts to create conflict within the leadership of the Srpska republic were made. Another very simple proof that these statements are not true is that the members of the Presidency and the Assembly of the Srpska republic came into politics from other professions, not because they wanted power but because they wanted to help their people in the difficult war situation. Almost all our representatives, beginning from the mayors to the members of the Assembly, are people who have been successful in other professions and not in politics. If you conducted a poll among them, you would see that all of them cannot wait to return to their original professions of lawyers, engineers etc. This is also proof that nobody among us is fighting for power. We are struggling for our people, until a just solution is reached, but then we shall cede our power to someone else.

[Ruzic] At the beginning of the war in 1992 you participated in negotiations with the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] about Sarajevo Airport. The result of these negotiations was that the airport was placed under UNPROFOR control. UNPROFOR members are still stationed at the airport. If "the blue helmets" withdraw from he airport, who will control such an important strategic point, the Serbs or the Muslims?

[Koljevic] It would be quite logical that the Serbs get this area for the simple reason that it was the Serbs who transferred it to the UNPROFOR. The second reason is simply the question of ownership. This has always been Serbian soil, and the airport was in our possession. This is a problem of property as a category. The third, but no less important reason is the communication issue. If a political solution is reached for Sarajevo the easiest way to establish communication between the Serbs in the Sarajevo quarters of Lukavica and Ilidza will be through the airport area. This should not be a big problem for the Muslim side since this is an uninhabited area.

This can be compared with the situation in Posavina and around Brcko. Our strategic interest in these areas is far bigger than it is the interest of the Muslim side. If an agreement is reached, interests have to be respected. If the Muslim side, which is interested in having access to Central Bosnia from Sarajevo, gets it, the airport will be the major Serbian interest. We had talks about this problem recently, and I think that it is very important for the Serbian side to get a new confirmation of this historical fact. It was our forces that gave it up to the benefit of the UNPROFOR so that we think that we are more entitled to this place of strategic interest [than the Muslims]. If there is good will to achieve peace this issue must be solved to our benefit. If senseless steps are made, and if the United Nations is biased, this issue will be solved in another way, but I hope that the Serbian side will not be forced to use other means.

[Ruzic] Can you tell us what your current activities are?

[Koljevic] As the chairman of the State Committee for the Cooperation with the UNPROFOR I am primarily working on the regulation of our mutual relations, which have come into a crisis, especially after the adoption of the latest resolutions by the UN Security Council and the introduction of the sanctions against the Srpska republic. Most of the time I am working on the regulation and improvement of these relations. We are trying to explain to the UN forces that they can stay here only if they are more neutral and objective toward the warring factions. We know what concessions the UNPROFOR is granting to the Muslim side, not only in the field of humanitarian aid but also in the field of infrastructures so that we required in the latest round of negotiations that Serbian facilities and communications be repaired, too. We agree that Sarajevo should have electric power, but Krajina must have it, too. UNPROFOR has to show that it is neutral. Our attitude toward UNPROFOR will depend on its neutrality. It will also be a condition for its further deployment. Apart from these activities, I am also trying to work in my original field of work, culture. I hope that some results will be seen soon.

I am deeply convinced that if the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] ideology is based on Serbian traditions, its political basis must then be basic advantages of the Serbian culture. In the opposite case it could become cheap. Together with the people I have contacts with I am trying to make our culture as precious as possible and I think that it will become an increasingly important part of our politics. If we want to reestablish the Serbian nation from the moral and mental point of view, the culture must have a dominant position, too. I think that certain activities will become much clearer soon.

**[Box, p 5]**

**Sensible Peace**

"As far as the Serbs are concerned, I would like to point out and I think that I share my opinion with other Bosnian Serb leaders when I say that we shall persevere and that there will be no disharmony, which has been a traditional Serbian fear. As far as the Muslims and the Croats are concerned, I have recently heard from their distinguished representatives that there is the opinion, especially in the Muslim part of Sarajevo, that it is the Serbs who want to wage a war for war's sake. This is an artificial opinion. There is no such nation that could get used to suffering so that it would want to go on fighting. The Serbs have proven on several occasions that they want a sensible peace agreement. There are no extremists or radicals with impossible requirements in either the Srpska republic leadership or among our population," Koljevic said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Box, p 5]

**End of Media War**

[Ruzic] It is unrewarding to make predictions, but I would still like you to tell OSLOBODJENJE readers how the events in the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina will unfold in your opinion.

[Koljevic] I have to say that I have often had to make predictions during this unfortunate conflict, which has included many media activities. The situation changes very quickly, there are many new elements that enter the political game and political relations on the daily basis. Who could have predicted that the Contact Group would act according to the principle "take it or leave it?" Who could have predicted that it would come to the present difficulties between the Srpska republic and Yugoslavia, especially to the sanctions that were imposed on us. History will perhaps take a different course, but it seems to me that a political solution cannot be found in the present unnatural way—that the big powers make a plan which has to accepted by all warring factions. I think that at least a truce has to be reached as soon as possible. Then negotiations should start not only with mediators but directly with the representatives of the newly established federation and the Srpska republic. In my opinion there is another matter that is very important if we want to change the political climate. It is important that the present media war ends. We know very well that this war started in the media; we know that the media played a horrible role in creating negative atmosphere, offensive for everyone who did not support the idea of a unitary Bosnia- Herzegovina outside Yugoslavia. The media war has to stop; I would be happy if it were something I could personally work on, too.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

### Talks Between Authorities, Serbs To Begin

*LD2610144994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The negotiations between representatives of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serbs from the UN protected areas will be held in Zagreb tomorrow. This was confirmed by the state commission for relations with the protection forces. The statement says that the delegation of the Croatian authorities will be headed by Hrvoje Sarinic, the president of the state commission for relations with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. The local Serbs will be represented by Borislav Mikelic and Milan Babic.

The talks, held under the auspices of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, will also be attended by cochairmen Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg and Ambassadors Geert Ahrens and Kai Eide. The two delegations are expected to discuss the normalization of overall relations in the framework of UN Security Council resolutions, especially Resolution 947, as well as the resolution of the fourth special political committee of the UN General Assembly. They will also discuss a series of specific issues, such as the establishing of road and rail traffic, the opening of the pipelines, the restoration of the water supply, and other issues.

After the Zagreb agreement, this is the first meeting in the process of the reintegration of the occupied areas into Croatia's constitutional and legal system. This is said in the statement from the state commission for relations with the protection forces.

### RSK Delegation Leaves for Zagreb

*LD2710085994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0825 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 27 Oct (TANJUG)—A delegation of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] left for Zagreb this morning for talks with Croatia on economic relations and cooperation.

Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic is leading the delegation, which also includes Dr. Branko Petrovic, minister for economic relations, industry, and development; Energy Minister Milivoj Kricka; General Mile Novakovic, national security adviser of the republic's president; Aleksandar Draca, assistant minister of internal affairs; and Nebojsa Jaksic, assistant minister for water management.

### Negotiations Begin

*LD2710110894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1034 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb, 27 Oct (TANJUG)—Talks between the delegations of Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina on how to resolve the conflict began this morning in the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] offices at Zagreb airport.

It has been announced that in the talks, which are being held behind closed doors, there will be discussion of the normalization of relations between Zagreb and Knin, especially the opening of roads and an oil pipeline, as well as electricity and water supplies.

The delegations are being led by Hrvoje Sarinic and Borislav Mikelic, and the meeting is being chaired by international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. Also taking part are UN ambassadors Geert Ahrens and Kai Eide as well as Leonid Kerestedzhiyants and Peter Galbraith, ambassadors of Russia and the United States. [passage omitted]

### Babic's Absence Noted

*LD2710100094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hrvoje] Sarinic [head of Croatian President Tudjman's office] said as he arrived for the talks with a republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] delegation:

[Begin Sarinic recording] I cannot say [word indistinct] for the moment, but I have even heard that Mr. Babic [RSK foreign minister] is not coming, and that would certainly be a very unpleasant piece of news because I do not see how any agreements could be reached without this powerful man on their political scene, if I may put it this way. [end recording]

### Martic Views UN Policy

*LD2710113194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1044 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 27 Oct (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina, sent a letter today to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali in which he informs him of the possible dangerous consequences of a change in UN policy toward the Krajina-Croatia conflict.

In this connection, Martic cites the resolution of the UN special committee for policy and decolonization, which treats the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina as an occupied area.

The republic of Serb Krajina president also warns Butrus-Ghali of the frequency of the adoption of UN resolutions which diverge substantially from the provisions of the Vance plan, thus prejudicing a political solution.

Warning the UN secretary general of the increasingly frequent threats to the republic of Serb Krajina by Croatian statesmen, Martic further stresses in his letter:

"I am surprised by your passing over of these statements and stances in silence. This turnabout in UN policy vis-a-vis the Krajina-Croatia conflict could disrupt in a

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

significant way the peace process and in the worst case call into question the results of the negotiating process."

Stresing in his letter to Butrus-Ghali that the UN Protected Areas [UNPA's] are not and cannot be occupied, and that the Serb nation cannot be accused of occupying their own country, Martic expresses the conviction and hope that the secretary general "will at the right moment point out the dangerous tendency of biased UN policy, so that the initiated peace process, which is being seriously jeopardized, might be preserved."

### Tudjman Meets With Lord Owen, Stoltenberg

*LD2610190494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has received Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the Geneva conference on former Yugoslavia, in the presidential palace.

The meeting focused on overall Serbian-Croatian relations, the possibilities of reintegrating the occupied areas in Croatia, and the upcoming talks between the delegations of Croatian authorities and representatives of local Serbs from the occupied areas.

Having briefed Tudjman on their talks with Serbian President Milosevic, Tudjman reiterated Croatia's stands. Croatia favors the peaceful settlement of the crisis within the framework of appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, especially Resolution 947, and the resolution of the UN General Assembly's Fourth Political Committee. The Croatian state delegation will discuss this subject in Zagreb tomorrow.

The president also reiterated the binding decisions of the Croatian Assembly regarding the reintegration of the occupied areas and UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate.

### Owen Says Milosevic Supporting Serbs in Croatia

*LD2710011294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0009 GMT 27 Oct 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, 26 Oct (TANJUG)—European Union mediator David Owen late Wednesday said Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic would not recognize Croatia until Croatia had met the local Serbs' demands.

Owen said in Zagreb that Milosevic was not (?prepared to) take steps for (?recognizing) Croatia until Serbs in Croatia had been made offers that would meet their demands.

Speaking after a meeting with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, which was attended also by United Nations mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg, Owen said Milosevic was unwilling to take any steps that might betray the trust the Serbs in Croatia had in him.

Owen said Milosevic would not be (?taking) part in the upcoming talks between Croatia and Serb Krajina, but wished to iron out the differences between them.

He [passage indistinct] talks he and Stoltenberg had held in Belgrade and Zagreb on Wednesday were not part of any new plan, but an effort to promote relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia.

Owen and Stoltenberg conferred with Milosevic in Belgrade earlier Wednesday, before leaving for Zagreb.

Owen said he and Stoltenberg would [passage indistinct] a Croatia-(?Serb) Krajina talks in Zagreb on Thursday. He said the closed-door talks would try to work out problems concerning water and power supply and the reopening of roads und the oil pipeline.

### Reported 'Z-4' Group Plan Seen as 'Defeat'

*AU2510144194 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Oct 94 pp 6-7*

[Report by Bruno Lopandic: "What Does Z-4 Mini-Contact Group's Secret, Frightening Plan Contain?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The secret plan for Croatia that has been so much discussed and written about recently brings nothing good, unfortunately. This is the conclusion that can be drawn following an unofficial statement by a diplomat close to the cochairmen of the peace conference on former Yugoslavia, who claims that the details of the plan reported by the Belgrade weekly TELEGRAF correspond closely to what the mini-contact group has been discussing. The high-ranking diplomat has thus wiped out all hope that the report might only reflect Serbian aspirations, aimed at promoting Serbian interests in the public. So, from the point of view of the international negotiators, such a solution creates a realistic framework for the final settlement of the Croatian problem, and later also of the situation in the entire former Yugoslavia. "This region must start functioning again," says the high-ranking foreign official, who wished to remain anonymous.

What is the realistic framework for settlement of the problem of reintegration of certain Croatian regions all about? Unfortunately, the high-ranking diplomat has only confirmed the information in the Belgrade weekly, which is reportedly close to Slobodan Milosevic's circles. First, the Serbs in Croatia are supposed to be given the status of constituent people, full political and economic autonomy, including the possibility of confederal union with Serbia. It is demanded that special army units be organized with a joint Serbo-Croatian command, but without any obligation on the Serbs to serve in the Croatian Army. Zagreb is required to give guarantees that in the next 20 years it will provide minimal economic aid. All these demands are supposed to be ratified by the UN Security Council.

#### Dollar Instead of Kuna

Furthermore, Zagreb should offer Knin two Serbian counties, Knin and Banija, and one Serbian district in

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

each of the following regions: Lika, Kordun, eastern and western Slavonia. Baranja, however, should be given special status, according to the plan. Autonomy of those Serbian counties would apply to education, local legislature, the police, and army service in territorial regiments but not in the Croatian Army. In addition, it is demanded that certain changes in the Croatian Assembly's Constitutional Law on National Minorities and Ethnic Communities be negotiated. While the plan does not mention currency, according to the foreign diplomat, it should not be the kuna in any case, because Serbs would never accept that. As one of the solutions the U.S. dollar is proposed. In western Slavonia smaller police squads would be established that both the Croats and Serbs would be allowed to form (this has nothing to do with joint police forces), while the number of members of the civilian UNPROFOR police would also increase. The return of civilians would be based on the principle of reciprocity. The Serbs could return to villages adjacent to Grubisino Polje field, while the Croats could return in the areas around Okucani, Novska and Lipik.

As for road traffic, the Novska-Okucani road would be reopened, provided that the Krajina Serbs are allowed to travel to Petrinja via Sisak. In the region currently controlled by the Serbs the Zagreb-Split railroad via Plitvice and Knin would be reopened. Although the trains would be escorted by UNPROFOR police, the personnel on board and on the ground would be under the direct authority of Knin. Zagreb is supposed to open a special bank account for the salaries and pensions of those personnel. Still, for the time being it is not stated in which bank the account would be opened. As an integral part of this reconnecting it is planned to reopen the highway and railroad between Croatia and Serbia. This includes the reopening of the Adriatic oil pipeline. Of course, this presupposes the lifting of the embargo on transit through the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], as well as on oil, which comes to Serbia from Croatia through the pipeline. On the other hand, Zagreb is supposed to pay Krajina for oil obtained in Djeletovci.

**The Plan Still in the Air**

According to official statements by EU representative Kei Eide, diplomatic recognition of Croatia by Milosevic's regime is very close. "In that respect I am very optimistic," Eide claims. Although the statement regarding recognition insists that the condition for the settlement of the status of the Serbian Krajina is direct negotiation acceptable to both parties, there is a clause in the plan that the border at Cape Ostro (Prevlaka) could be established by direct negotiation between the two parties or by international arbitration. In return, Croatia should recognize the FRY, without prejudging the question of international continuity, succession, or property division.

However, this plan, with the foreign diplomat's frightening assessment that it is a realistic solution, has not still been put on paper. There are several reasons for that. The first is certainly disagreement within the mini-contact group itself, which everyone is already calling the Z-4 group. It is about a conflict between the American and the Russian concepts. The American concept, apart from supporting a broad autonomy for Serbs, still insists on reintegration of Serb-controlled territories into Croatia in the first place. The Russians, however, are openly interceding for the establishment of a federal unit where the Serbian majority lives, giving them the right to form a confederation with the mother country. There is no doubt that the Russian attitude will get French support, because President Mitterand has already said that the borders between the former Yugoslav republics are only administrative, which suits Serbian demands. The second reason that the plan has not been officially proposed yet is fear of how Tudjman and Milosevic would react to all this. To convince the two sides of the correctness of their intentions, the international mediators are using the old tactic of carrot and stick. The reward for Serbs has certainly been the lifting of a part of the sanctions. Vitaliy Churkin, who has played a major role in designing such proposals, enthusiastically said on the occasion when the first Russian plane landed in Belgrade: "At last; we have been working such a long time to see this!" The only thing with which Milosevic is being threatened is the obligation to bridle the long-beards [reference to Serbs] from Knin, who still consider secession to be the best solution.

**Pressure on Croatia**

In any case, much greater pressure is being put on Croatia. According to the aforementioned diplomat, Croatia will be criticized (if it has not already been during the recent visit by Owen, Stoltenberg, Akashi and Ahrens to Zagreb) for the Medjak pocket, evictions, violation of human rights. Croatia's considerable step forward in its search for a compromise by passing the Constitutional Law on the Rights of Minorities and Ethnic Communities has not been enough. That is because, as the international mediators claim, in drafting the law the Croatian Assembly did not consider the Badinter Commission's remarks, and the law does not comply with the Hague Convention principles regarding the right to national symbols, an autonomous educational system, legislative bodies, and an autonomous administrative structure, including the police and judiciary. Of course, one of the major issues is Croatian policy on Bosnia, while according to direct participants in debates, there is a general tendency to avoid characterization and exact distinction between victim and aggressor. Circles close to the peace conference on former Yugoslavia consider the Bosnia issue to be a conflict of three equally responsible sides. As an explanation for all these steps the international mediators invoke the alleged secret negotiations between Tudjman's and Milosevic's envoys in Graz [in southern Austria]. The aforementioned diplomat has also confirmed this assertion, saying also that both delegations have in principle endorsed the new plan for Croatia.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Perhaps the international mediators are trying to justify their latest moves by such statements, so one should not speculate about them too much. In any case, it has become clear that the international community has started an extremely forceful diplomatic initiative that obviously brings nothing good to Croatia. A whole range of concessions to Knin might easily be put in connection with the latest performances by Lord Owen, whose initial observations pointed out the need for minor changes of borders, only to deliver a fervent speech about nationalism and separatism in Croatia several days ago in London at a lecture in the Guildhall, where he also recalled appalling atrocities done by Ustashas during World War II. It is interesting to note that he did not mention a single word about the Serbian hegemonistic policy and its methods of ethnic cleansing, particularly in its latest aggression against Croatia.

**Cause for Concern**

Some foreign correspondents have suggested that the latest developments are precisely part of long-planned scenario: to reintegrate the regions of former Yugoslavia. Regardless of whether this is true or false, the bitter impression remains that there is cause for concern. The army, foreign policy and finances are the basis of any country's viability, and disorder in only one of these elements leads into disaster. Because, if you have control over the territory and the army, you can always collect taxes and duties by force, and appoint your own officials. Since the entire issue is still up in the air, we should wait to see how the situation develops and what the official explanations are. Only then should we react. However, given the current state of affairs, the information so far should be taken with a portion of skepticism, although, unfortunately, there is much cause for concern. If all the international community's intentions prove to be true, it would mean that a defeat is being designed for Croatia, whereas for Serbs a reward for aggression and all the crimes is being prepared, which actually means the creation of a state within a state.

## RSK's Martic Discusses 'Internal Tensions'

*AU2510171194 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Oct 94 p 5*

[FONET-attributed report: "Internal Tensions Weaken State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin—"In the coming days we can expect intense international political and diplomatic pressure on the people and the leadership of the republic of Serbian Krajina with the aim of imposing on us political solutions that would reintegrate us back into Croatia," says the text of the address to the people of Krajina by Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, that was handed to reporters yesterday.

Referring to the strengthening of Krajina's position in the diplomatic sphere following the signing of the Zagreb Agreement, Martic admits with regret that, in the internal sphere, the level of political unity has not been reached, which is necessary to improve sufficiently the negotiating position and the defense capability of the republic of Serbian Krajina.

"The replacement of people on all levels according to the principle of political party membership, and the abuse of state institutions for party promotion," Martic says, "has resulted in the strengthening of internal tensions, dissatisfaction among the people and fighters, and the growing wish for revanchism, which threatens to destabilize the state and endanger the basic interests of the people."

According to President Martic, the position of Krajina has been additionally worsened by the severance of all the ties between Yugoslavia and the Srpska republic, with which Krajina is closely linked. Martic also says that the republic of Serbian Krajina has accepted the joint political program with the Srpska republic as regards "the solutions offered by the world powers."

As for the relations with mother Serbia, Martic says that these have never been brought into question, as the creation of a united Serbian state remains Krajina's aim over which there can be no political bargaining.

## Martic Cabinet Refutes Report

*AU2510125494 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Oct 94 p 5*

[Article by "M.B.": "Political Pamphlet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The cabinet of the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] Milan Martic yesterday reacted to an article in 20 October edition of VECERNJE NOVOSTI under the headline "Secret Division of Territories," which mentions alleged haggling with Krajina territories by the Republic of Croatia and the Serbian Republic, with a sharply worded statement for the public:

"The above-mentioned text is a common political pamphlet, which has lately become the standard in reporting by VECERNJE NOVOSTI. Its aim is to upset the public in the republic of Serbian Krajina, destabilize the political situation, and create a division between the people and the leaderships of the RSK and the Srpska republic," the it says at the start of the statement, which begins with a slogan: "Only NOVOSTI can do this."

The signatory of the statement, Petar Damjanic, chief of the Information Service of the RSK president, expresses a belief that such an attempt will remain without the desired effect:

"The RSK is a reality that has emerged through the will of the people, who are the only ones who can decide on the fate of their state. This fact annoys precisely those who are launching such imputations," Damjanic writes.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

## Refugees Dissatisfied With UN Resolution 947

*95BA00012 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 5 Oct 94 p 7*

[Article by Snjezana Canic: "Dissatisfied With Resolution 947"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The displaced persons do not see any reason for optimism; they say that on paper everything is being fulfilled, but practice is something different. They are warning about the large amounts of fuel that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] is taking into the occupied areas.*

Osijek—"Although people are talking about Croatia's diplomatic victory in spite of the clause about Butrus-Ghali's obligation to submit a report by 20 January 1995 about the progress of the UN's work, the displaced persons do not see any reason for optimism in that. On paper everything is being fulfilled, but practice is always something different."

This was stated by Mato Simic, president of the Croatian Community of Displaced Persons [ZPH], at a meeting of the Community of Displaced Persons of the Osijek-Baranja zupanija, held on Monday evening, at which there was a discussion of UN Security Council Resolution 947.

Simic announced a meeting of the members of the ZPH Executive Board and all presidents of the zupanija communities on Friday in Zagreb, at which there will be a discussion of the last Security Council meeting. At that time the ZPH will announce its opinion on Resolution 947 and on the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate.

Baldo Matic, president of the executive board of the Baranja branch of the ZPH, reiterated that the displaced persons' demands, presented after the end of the blockade of UNPROFOR, had not been met, and therefore concluded: "Either our assessments were bad or our demands were unrealistic, but the displaced persons do not deserve promises that cannot be fulfilled and that degrade us as human beings."

At this time the displaced persons are most concerned about the difficulty of their living conditions. This includes the problems of housing and evictions and employment, and monetary and humanitarian assistance are not being resolved in a high-quality manner or quickly enough. The displaced persons are most critical of the Croatian Government, which is expected to ensure a basis for subsistence and basic human rights. To the displaced persons, those rights include living in one's home, on one's hearth and land. They perceive the UNPROFOR pilot program almost as a deception and a mechanism for calming the tensions that were emphasized during the UNPROFOR blockade campaign.

The members of the Osijek-Baranja Zupanija emphasized the need for the Croatian Government to express an opinion on Resolution 947 and state President Tudjman's position and opinion regarding it.

At the meeting, they also proposed another blockade of UNPROFOR, a protest by displaced persons in front of the Assembly, and seeking the fulfillment of all the demands submitted after the end of the blockade. One of the possible ways of expressing their dissatisfaction is calling upon the displaced persons to engage in civil disobedience. Those are only proposals for the time being, however.

This week the members of the ZPH Executive Board are also to meet with Minister Jarnjak regarding the disturbing news about the amount of fuel that UNPROFOR is bringing into the occupied areas of Croatia. Specifically, there is the fact that since the end of the blockade of UNPROFOR, 600,000 liters of fuel have been brought across the Nemetino border crossing.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

## Local VMRO-DPMNE Branches Protest Boycott

*AU2710092894 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 26 Oct 94 p 4*

[Unattributed report: "We Are Losing a Lot Due to the Boycott"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Berovo, 25 October—The decision of the opposition to boycott the second electoral round has disappointed numerous members and affiliates of all the parties, but also some undetermined voters in this commune. This decision has caused the greatest revolt among the numerous members of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity]. Many members of the VMRO- DPMNE think that their party had to participate in the elections, particularly in those constituencies where their candidates are in first or second place. Many VMRO-DPMNE members in Berovo and Pehcevo think that this senseless decision to boycott is a result of the analyses of the republican leadership, and not of the whole membership.

As VMRO-DPMNE parliamentary candidate from Berovo Marjan Rutevski said: "My party's mistake was enormous, that is the mistake of its leadership to boycott the elections. However, since I am a member of the VMRO-DPMNE, I shall respect the decision of the Central Committee to boycott the second electoral round. I received 3,261 votes, which is 212 less than the first candidate of the Alliance fro Macedonia, and I had an enormous chance of winning. Now, I have disappointed all our members, affiliates, and all those that voted for us. I, personally, have lost a lot."

In spite of the revolt among the membership of the VMRO-DPMNE in Berovo and Pehcevo, we found out that the communal committees will support the boycott on Sunday [30 October].

If the members and affiliates of these parties accept the boycott, the struggle for one parliamentary seat will be waged on Sunday between Mitko Ilievski, candidate of the Alliance for Macedonia, and independent candidate Slavco Siracevski.

## Parties Assess Need for Election Boycott

*AU2710111494 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 26 Oct 94 p 4*

[Article by "S.Vs." and "E.S.": "There Were Irregularities, but We Shall Not Pull Out"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The largest opposition parties in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], that is the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the DP [Democratic Party], remain categorical in their stances published in their memorandum: That is that if their requests are not met (the postponement of the elections and the resignation of the government and the State Electoral Commission), they will boycott the second electoral round. This decision by the two opposition parties was also joined by the MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action]. In effect, this means that 84 VMRO-DPMNE, 68 DP, and four MAAK candidates will resign if they are elected to parliament.

What will happen to the remaining nine political parties, plus the Alliance for Macedonia, that have candidates, regardless of their number, entering the second electoral round, and do they think that the elections can be democratic if two opposition parties refuse to take part?

The Democratic Party of Macedonia (in Tetovo) is not in favor of a boycott. However, they think that the second electoral round should be better organized and all irregularities removed. "If there had been remarks by more political parties," they said, "and if their remarks had been supported by appropriate arguments, the elections would have been annulled. However, this did not happen, and now we have to appeal to the consciousness of the citizens to go out to vote again." According to Tomislav Stojanovski, president of the Democratic Party of Macedonia, "the boycott by the opposition will be reflected negatively, particularly in Tetovo. If the Macedonians do not go out to vote, all nine seats will be taken by the Albanians. That is why it is in interest of the citizens to take part in the second electoral round."

For Abdurahman Aliti, the leader of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], the announcement of the boycott arrived late because there are no legal procedures by which the candidates can be withdrawn from the ballots. The law does not provide the possibility of a collective resignation. "The effect will be seen after the publication of the results of the second round, when it will be possible to make relevant political assessments. The decision of the two parties to boycott the elections is a result of their dissatisfaction with the first electoral round and of their incapability to face reality. I do not know whether the boycott is the best solution," Aliti said. He also added that their claims about the electoral rolls are consistent because "we have also made some claims, but at that time the opposition thought that only Albanians were missing from the electoral rolls. The voting demonstrated that Macedonians were also missing." According to the results of the first round, in Aliti's opinion, there is no reason to believe that the second round will not be democratic if the other irregularities are removed. What is of importance for him is to secure the citizens' right to vote.

"We shall continue with the second electoral round because we believe that the elections should be supported, regardless of some irregularities and failures. If we boycott the elections, then an even greater disunity in the already unstable Macedonian body will emerge. Bearing this situation in mind, however, it might be necessary to organize new elections soon, but not now," Aleksandar Donev, president of the Social Democratic Party of Macedonia [SDPM], said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

In his opinion, democracy has faded in Macedonia because the use of rallies and populist meetings did not favor democratic, equal elections for all political subjects in the republic. "This is more related to the parliamentary elections, while as far as the presidential elections are concerned, I think that the known present has won over the unknown future. The mentality of our people is probably to be more interested in a poor peace than in a rich unrest." As we have found out, the executive board of the SDPM will hold a session today at which an assessment of the new situation will be made.

The president of the Democratic Party of Turks, Erdogan Sarac, thinks that democracy must be accomplished only through the institutions of the system, and to boycott the elections, that is to give up political struggle, does not conform to the development of democracy. "All the participants in the electoral race counted on some irregularities, however we agreed to take part in the free expression of the political will, and we shall persist in this regardless of the results of the elections," Sarac said. In his opinion, democracy cannot be determined in the streets, and the announced boycott reflects badly on Macedonia in the international arena. "The leaders of these opposition parties have already proclaimed themselves as prime ministers, but there can only be one prime minister, and now they are angry because they have been defeated. If the international observers have assessed that the elections are democratic, there is no reason for us to disagree with them, although we expect all irregularities from the first electoral round to be removed," Sarac stated.

According to the leader of the PCER [Party for Full Emancipation of Romanies in Macedonia], Faik Abdi, the announcement of the opposition parties' boycott will harm the reputation of Macedonia. "There is no reason to annul the elections, although there were some irregularities. We do not intend to pull out of the elections, although we think that, if there are new elections, we shall have better results. The parties that have decided to boycott the elections are probably not aware of the consequences for the reputation of Macedonia in the eyes of the international public," Abdi said.

The VMRO-DP believes that the elections should be annulled because of the irregularities in the first round. "Regarding our party statements on the boycott, we expressed our solidarity with the request for the cancellation of the elections. In this context, we consider the present political situation confusing, and, at this moment, we are assessing what the boycott could mean for the democratic processes," Vladimir Golubovski, VMRO-DP president said. "We have not contacted any other opposition party regarding this, and we have not yet reached a decision. Nevertheless, we think that the second electoral round will not be democratic, because the political parties have positioned themselves in advance, and that is something that has influenced the voters. It cannot be corrected now, but matters should be restarted and new elections should be organized."

The NDP [People' Democratic Party] assesses that the boycott will be reflected in the work of the future parliament, and it does not believe that the future parliament will survive the whole four year term. "Our parliamentary group," Bedredim Ibrimi, NDP secretary said, "and I believe other Albanian parties, too, will strive for an early adoption of electoral laws and for new early elections, because the Albanians have suffered the greatest damage in these elections."

### Participation in Second Electoral Round Estimated

*AU2710092394 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 26 Oct 94 pp 1, 4*

[Unattributed report: "The Citizens Do Not Accept the Boycott"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A team from Macedonian Radio conducted a telephone poll encompassing 985 voters from all communes in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. The goal was to obtain a general view of the stances of the citizens regarding the elections, the political parties, and their motives for going out to vote as an expression of personal opinions about the parties. The sample selection was random but proportional, and was selected by computer from the telephone book of the Republic of Macedonia, presenting exactly 0.072 percent of the electorate.

According to the results, of the total number of the citizens encompassed in the poll, 527 supported the Alliance for Macedonia, which is 53.5 percent, while 116 supported the Democratic Party, which is 11.8 percent. In this poll, 81 citizens supported the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] which is 8.2 percent. Fifty-two citizens supported parties that have their candidates for the second election round, which is 5.3 percent. It is characteristic that 152 citizens, which is 15.4 percent, do not have an opinion on which party, coalition, or independent candidate they would support in the second round. Fifty-seven citizens said that they would not vote at all.

As far as the support, that is nonsupport, for the appeal of some opposition parties to boycott the second election round is concerned, analysis showed that out of the 985 citizens encompassed in the poll, 737, or 74.8 percent, were against the appeal, while 144, which is 14.6 percent, stated that they would support it. One hundred and four citizens, 10.6 percent, had not reached a final decision on this.

Asked about which party they supported and whether they would respond to the boycott appeal, of the 527 citizens who would vote for the Alliance for Macedonia, 93.1 percent said that they would not support this appeal; 3.6 percent said that they would; and 3.3 percent said they did not have a definite opinion on this matter.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Of the 81 citizens who stated that they would vote for the VMRO-DPMNE, 62.9 percent said that they would support the boycott; 29.6 percent said that they would not; 7.5 percent said they did not have a definite opinion on the boycott.

Of the 116 citizens who would vote for the Democratic Party, more than one-third, that is 34.5 percent, said that they would support the appeal for boycott; 57.8 percent were opposed; 7.7 percent did not have a definite stance on the boycott.

According to the analysis of the Macedonian Radio team after the telephone poll, half of the citizens encompassed in the poll said that they would vote for the Alliance for Macedonia, which is 53.5 percent. As far as the appeal of some opposition parties for boycott is concerned, 74.8 percent said that they did not support the boycott, while 14.6 said that they did. From what the analyses showed, there is a great discrepancy between the citizens that have decided for different parties in reference to the appeal for a boycott. For instance, of the citizens that would vote for the Alliance for Macedonia, 93.1 percent did not support the appeal. Regarding those that would give their votes to the VMRO-DPMNE, 62.9 percent of them supported the appeal for a boycott, while 34.5 percent of those who would vote for the Democratic Party said that they would support the boycott.

**For which political party (coalition) will you vote in the second election round in the Republic?**

| | | (percent) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Alliance for Macedonia | 527 | 53.50 |
| 2. VMRO-DPMNE | 81 | 8.22 |
| 3. Democratic Party | 116 | 11.78 |
| 4. Other parties | 52 | 5.28 |
| 5. Without an opinion | 152 | 15.43 |
| 6. Will not vote | 57 | 5.79 |

## Ethnic Groups Express Doubts About Elections

*94BA0428A Skopje PULS in Macedonian*
*23 Sep 94 pp 12-13*

[Article by Mirce Tomovski: "'The Small Ones' Are Avoiding the Honorable Way"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Why do the representatives of the parties of the Turks, Serbians, Gypsies, and Vlachs say that the elections will not be fair and democratic? Could the majority electoral model be surmounted with coalitions?*

Increasingly emphasized in the Macedonian electoral environment are the political and ethnic aspects. The struggle between opposite political groups is aimed at proving who is right and who has a better chance to win. In the ethnic election race, the variegated national environment is emphasized in the marketing and the campaign waged by the political parties. The electorate is being cautioned against the damage caused by the "unprincipled coalition with Albanians," the threat to "Christianity from Islamization" (the Democratic Christian Party), the danger of the so-called Macedonian multi-ethnic state, which is "harming the national state" and threatens its unity (Ljubisa Georgievski, the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] candidate for president of the Republic). In this context, even Western Macedonia is presented as the accomplished Albanization of that area. Here the Albanian voters are being told that the "fragmentation (breaking into pieces) of the Albanian political power" would be fatal to their national interests and is the work of the political system in Macedonia, which by this token wishes the "good" of the Albanians (the Party for Democratic Prosperity). It is for the sake of this "good," that Muhamed Halili also mentions the possibility of "boycotting the elections," citing as the reason the issue of the "unresolved cases of citizenship," while the leadership of the People's Democratic Party is telling the Albanians in Macedonia that the "census was unsuccessful and faulty," and that "the elections will not be fair and democratic." The Alliance for Macedonia (SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], LP [Liberal Party], and SP [Socialist Party]) is presenting history and the multi-ethnic situation as the reality with which and within which one lives. It defends coexistence as a model of original multi-ethnic democracy and emphasizes the risk of worsening interethnic relations in an effort to earn electoral points.

Within this electoral framework, the political parties which encompass the Macedonian ethnic groups are modeling, in their own way, an independent situation in the battle for voters, for votes, for representatives in parliament, and for participation in the government. In terms of this function, how are the political parties of the ethnic groups—Albanian, Turkish, Gypsy, and Serbian, and the League of Vlachs—surviving under the present electoral system?

The empirical conclusion drawn by PULS, based on discussions with their leaders, emphasizes several points.

According to Faik Abdi, the chairman of the Party for the Full Emancipation of Romanies [Gypsies], "the fact that the new electoral law did not adopt the proportional variant is a major omission." "With it," Abdi says, "the ethnic groups would ensure their participation in the parliament, thus easing the political situation. Today it would be rare to have people in seats in the Macedonian Assembly because of the nonhomogeneous nature of 'their own' electoral body."

"If the new electoral law, which included the proportional principle had been adopted, some ethnic groups, such as the Vlachs, could have had their representatives

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

in parliament," according to Mitko Kostovski, chairman of the League of Vlachs. In his view "now some political manipulations become possible. In these elections some parties will have as their candidates members of the Vlach ethnic group. However, they will support the program of the party which nominated them and not the interests of the Vlachs. Such was the case in the past as well. A characteristic example of of this case was the speech by Representative Lulovski in parliament. He denied the existence of Vlachs, their culture, language, and so on, and no one objected," Kostovski noted.

Similar thoughts were expressed by Erdojan Sarac, the leader of the Democratic Party of Turks. "This electoral model is discriminatory and, in the present phase of development of democracy in Macedonia, creates some obvious problems in interethnic relations. For that reason, as early as four years ago we claimed, as we do now, that the new electoral laws are undemocratic and that the Turks are given the right only to participate in the elections but not to be elected. This law deprives of rights and profoundly harms the ethnic groups in Macedonia," stresses Sarac.

In the view of Dragisa Miletic, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, "the elections with the old electoral laws are aimed against Orthodoxy in Macedonia." "We are familiar," Miletic mentions, "with the saying according to which 'there are five parties for each Orthodox person,' which proves that the old electoral laws favor the Islamic parties, above all those of the Albanians—the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and the NDP [People's Democratic Party]. That is why we believe that voting on the basis of the old system is undemocratic and anti-Serb."

This kind of problem is not typical of the most influential party of Albanians in Macedonia, the Party for Democratic Prosperity. There is a concentration and homogenization of the Albanian electoral body in individual areas in Western Macedonia and in Skopje. That is why, while insisting on including in the new electoral draft laws the proportional variant and the criticism concerning the electoral units, its representatives in parliament agreed to hold the elections "in the old way." If nothing else, they will retain at least the same number of representatives in parliament. Djemail Idrizi, the leader of the Albanian Democratic Union-Liberal Party, believes that the Albanian population is definitely harmed by the old electoral laws and the poorly demarcated electoral units, which break up its compact nature. According to Idrizi, considering the splintering of the Albanian parties, they will have 15 seats. That is the reason for which his party has decided to abstain from participation in the elections, in order not to split the Albanian voters.

The opportunity for the ruling coalition to make possible, through the introduction of the proportional system, the defense of its specific interests, was lost. This was caused by the multicolored, multiethnic Macedonian environment. This model increases the chances of using the advantages enjoyed by the ethnic group whose political interests are articulated through its political parties established on a national basis. Thus, all groups, national, social, religious, or cultural, if they are able to have a real influence on "their own" voters, they may be represented in parliament. At the same time, in the case of ethnicly nonhomogeneous groups, this leads to interethnic balancing and enhances political stability. Naturally, this position in the electoral race would increase the strength of the democratic position of the ethnic groups and would enrich possibilities for the implementation of their political equality.

However the multiple electoral model as well has its own raison d'etre. It ensures the increased efficiency of the system under conditions of ethnic nonhomogeneity which, in Macedonian parliamentary practice as well as in the exercise of authority, occasionally becomes an obstruction. It provides better opportunities for the elimination of divisiveness based on ethnic or religious foundations. In terms of Macedonia, this offers a steady opportunity to avoid clashs among groups: the Macedonian people versus the Albanian ethnicity. In a certain sense, furthermore, this weakens "one's own milieu," and creates the habit of "going with strangers." Increasingly, the parties will have to make political arrangements in seeking support outside "their own backyard." This will be especially due to increased economic interests and to "making money."

Would this position be amended by encouraging coalitions with other or with bigger parties?

The views on this may vary but it appears that coalitions would influence the feeling of loss of rights. In the case of Erdojan Sarac, the only true coalition is the one with the parties in power. He explains that the Democratic Party of Turks has tried to develop a third alternate bloc of political forces. Although this initiative was adopted by a few parties, it could not be achieved. According to Miletic, his party, despite its discontent, will not boycott the elections and, to this effect, it has formed a coalition with four Macedonian parties. Hence his expectation of having five representatives in the next parliament. In Miletic's view this confirms the fact that "we are opposed to any division of Macedonia and to setting up some kind of autonomous areas, despite the accusations of the media, including PULS. Faik Abdi is resigned to the attitude of a coalition of the Union for Macedonia toward the PCER [Party for the Full Emancipation of Romanies]. We joined the three partners for the past four years in parliament. There have been speculations according to which we are being represented by the Socialist Party. This is not accurate. As a political entity, we cannot be represented by any other party. That is why now we are entering alone in the first round and, as to the second, we shall develop coalitions based on results. I am sure that our votes will be very significant." Mitko Kostovski, from the League of Vlachs, interprets this problem from a different viewpoint. "We did not set up a political party. We are paying the price of our civic

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

option and our cosmopolitanism. Those are the reasons for which we have not set up a national party, as well as the fear of nationalistic divisions within our ranks. Since we have no suitable concentration of voters we are forced to enter into a coalition. In this context we insist that attention be paid to the real demands of Vlachs. The Alliance for Macedonia has made us promises to this effect. However, the league will independently run its candidate in Struga."

The different aspirations may be one of the answers to the question of the reason why these parties are nominating candidates for head of the Macedonian state. The Democratic Party of Turks has nominated Dr. Halid Saban; the Democratic Party of Serbs, in coalition, nominated and then withdrew the nomination of Milan Dancevski, while the parties of the Albanians have not as yet nominated a candidate. Meanwhile, Djemail Idrizi has developed an interesting attitude toward this issue: "We shall not vote if the PDP or any other party nominates an Albanian candidate for president of the Republic. Considering the split in the Macedonian vote, it may happen that the Albanian candidate win. This would also mean a dangerous destabilization of Macedonia!"

Otherwise, virtually without exception, the representatives of these parties believe that the elections will not be fair and honest despite their claim of being democratic. However, no more substantial arguments have been brought forth to back up such claims.

The need for all these parties, which claim to express the national interests of "their own people," to participate in the elections and become part of the representative structures is entirely legitimate. It is motivated by their right to establish their own identity and set their own values. This is in contrast to the period of development of democratic processes on a pluralistic basis not only on in Macedonia, but even more broadly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It is precisely in this area that the line separating political gains between democracy and nationalism has proved to be very thin. The development of democratic processes began with nationalistic demands by national and ethnic groups for independence and identity. Meanwhile, nationalism quickly proved itself a poor fellow traveler of democracy, particularly in areas where it was delayed or blended with the narrower frameworks of social, societal, economic, and cultural features. Its different features exacerbated nationalistic quarrels and led to conflicts and wars, and brought about chauvinism at the end of this century. This particularly applied to the south, which is more primitive and more aggressive and where its qualities are the complete opposite of democracy. Freedom of political organization, on an ethnic basis as well, indicats a great democratic challenge to all the features of nationalism in Macedonian customs. Naturally, despite such features, it has not lost its ability to worsen the risk of losing a good life. So far, this test has been passed by the parties of the ethnic groups in the Macedonian state. There is no reason that this should not happen in the present elections, the more so since the future favors the adoption of civic standards. They encourage nationalism to take the "soft light of private life, of privacy."

## Prospects for Veteran Politician Tupurkovski

*94BA0407A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 2 Sep 94 pp 12-14*

[Article by Mirka Velinovska: "The Mission of the Messiah"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Vasil Tupurkovski is not involved in the government, and is not agreeing to an open political battle, but he has never "shut out" the possibility of returning to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] as a savior. After the political speech in Trnovo, his sympathizers predicted exactly when Tupurskovski's time would come!*

Ten days ago, in preelection Macedonia, a ranking of the leading politicians was published; it was prepared by "Brima" polling organization and published by VECER. One can see from it that the current president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, is still followed in popularity by Vasil Tupurskovski, the president of MOK [Macedonian Olympic Committee], a writer of Macedonian history from ancient times to the present day, a citizen of our country temporarily residing in the United States, a regular participant (and speaker) at the gathering in Trnovo, and a potential candidate for president of Macedonia. Below him is a whole series of current and active politicians, leaders of political parties who, in one way or another, have incorporated themselves into the construction of the new Macedonian society, and on the rocky domestic terrain, learned their first lessons about political struggle in multiparty systems, in the construction of parliamentary life, and the law-governed state.

It is precisely his high popularity among the citizens, and the fact that in the discussions everywhere his challenge to the head of state is viewed as a fait accompli, that resulted in a series of discussions in journalistic circles, in which we have tried to analyze the reasons for that much popularity, and analyze rationally the essence of his charisma, especially since it is quite well-known to political experts that Dr. Tupurkovski is the only politician who has made a whole series of blunders and gaffes during his career but has nevertheless avoided open criticism and political death.

In our attempt to discover what the Cile [nickname for Vasil] phenomenon consists of, we asked ourselves the following question: How is it possible for a politician who has gathered a whole collection of incredible gaffes during his career to rehabilitate himself over and over again, and not lose popular support? There is no comparison on the Macedonian political scene. It is well-known that several figures were ruthlessly executed politically for far smaller and more insignificant mistakes, for which the people never forgave them. In

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

seeking answers to the general fascination with this figure, we arrived at the conclusion that a considerable part of the blame is borne by the journalistic profession, which never gathered enough courage to comment on and criticize the mistakes that this person made throughout his career. For example, there was never any analysis of his involvement in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and especially in the "Ckrebic case" [Milosevic's lieutenant] at the 17th Plenum, when Vasil Tupurkovski, by uttering the expression "unprincipled coalition," virtually enthroned Slobodan Milosevic and helped him to finish what he had started: the antibureaucratic revolution, in which pictures of Cile were carried through Serbian squares like relics, followed by signs saying "Man—how proud that sounds!"—although he naturally hid his principles when the entire Kosovo leadership was destroyed, when a witch hunt was conducted for the arrest of Azem Vllasi, when his Slovene and Croatian colleagues were forced to resign. There was also no analysis of his vote to bring tanks into Belgrade's streets during the time of Ante Markovic, in March 1991, his stance with respect to the reforms, or even his independent (emotionally) speech in Bosnia, when he assured people that Yugoslavia would exist even though Macedonia had stepped onto the road to independence. Journalists did not analyze his speeches on the Vevcani case, when he promised the inhabitants of Vevcani that at a specially convened meeting of the Central Committee of the Macedonian League of Communists, he would tell his comrades "what was what," and in practice they kept silent. Journalists did not even get interested in his understanding of the right to use the water from Studencica, when he uttered the well-known "Whoever sits underneath the pear tree owns the pears," which meant that Prilep, which did not have the "pear tree" should not drink the water either, which was followed by the Prilep response that he should not come to their city and try to calm them with statements that would please their ears, and there was also the case of Novo Selo and Treska, conducted in the same style of "You are all right," and his criticism of the rigidity of Gligorov's policy—up until his latest speech in Trnovo, when he privately stated that he would base his political campaigning in Macedonia when the people summoned him and made him their leader.

Actually, his charisma is basically due to two elements: his skill in avoiding situations in which he would personally bear responsibility for what he says or does, which he has perfected completely, since not even the person with the longest memory can remember a situation when Tupurkovski got into any kind of open battle, and the proverbial tolerance of the Macedonian media in not making critical observations about his speeches to date. With respect to the people's fascination with "national Cile," it can be explained most vividly through the statement by one of his admirers that "I did not understand anything, but he spoke very beautifully."

Let us return, however, to Vasil Tupurkovski's standing and his chances of participating in Macedonian politics, which were covered in a way in the two articles in the last issue of PULS.

If his speech in Trnovo and his inclusion in the list of active and current politicians is understood as a comeback by Vasil Tupurkovski, who decided of his own free will to leave politics for the past three years and work on writing Macedonian history, and on American soil to boot, it is natural for the Macedonian public to inquire about what is being offered, especially since this is a rare opportunity, since his only public involvement (if, of course, we do not count the time he spent as Gligorov's personal representative in the United States) during this time was in connection with the Macedonian Olympic Committee, and to the best of our knowledge, he has successfully resisted all attempts by the Macedonian political parties to win him over. He had good excuses, but as a politician who has a strongly developed feel for avoiding high-risk situations, he probably wanted to preserve his aura of a national figure for better times and after an assessment of the strength of all the existing parties. Now, this summer, he is suddenly appearing at a traditional gathering with a clear political speech and in a ranking that verifies the popularity of the present politicians who will participate in the upcoming elections, without any particular reason, if his statement that he does not intend to participate in these elections and that he has commitments in the United States is sincere. Vasil Tupurkovski, as we have learned, has announced to several people whom he trusts and who are close to the media or in them, that he intends to return to Macedonia in January 1995, since he thinks that there will be early elections in our country in a year and a half at the latest. He will not base his candidacy on any of the existing parties; the SDSM [Social-Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] does not suit him because it does not agree with his platform, the Liberals and Cile do not love each other, and he does not want to go openly with the nationalists but will instead be based on the Democratic Party from Tetovo, which in the meantime should be located in Skopje and which has the task of securing logistical support from the University, i.e., some of the professors and the students, workers' dissatisfaction institutionalized in certain independent trade unions, and naturally the Macedonians from the Aegean part of Macedonia.

According to an interpretation of his statements, which probably should be convincing and serious enough, Dr. Tupurkovski is the only one in Macedonia who knows the formula for getting out of the Greek-Macedonian dead end, he is the only one who has excellent relations with the leadership of the United States, Italy..., and, allegedly, the candidate on whom the United States will bet. His program is even being prepared in this country. During these talks, Tupurkovski also announced that the policy of equidistance, which was not yielding results, should be abandoned, and replaced by a policy of reciprocity: whichever state establishes closer relations

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

with Macedonia, Macedonia will respond to it with an equivalent amount of love, which is something that we have heard previously from other leaders, but with one small difference—Tupurkovski and the leaders in question are not thinking of a love affair with the same country.

In effect, in these conversations for the record there was a broader elaboration of his famous four points, uttered in a speech to Aegean Macedonians in Trnovo: 1) criticism of the authorities for neglecting the moral aspect in building our society—which implies an appeal to those national strata which are barely making ends meet with their monthly incomes of 200 marks, which can be blamed on the commitment to embark upon economic reforms, privatization, bankruptcies... in contrast to certain other select individuals who have meanwhile found a way to get rich; 2) social neglect, once again as criticism of the authorities, which encompasses an appeal to a wide range of social groups; 3) dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of equidistance from our neighbors, which implies replacing that policy with a rapprochement with someone, based more on the principle of cooperation; and—which in our opinion deserves exclusive attention—the theory that a serious political alternative has not yet been established in Macedonia.

If we take them in order, the first two points in his "Anti-During" [reference to treatise by Friedrich Engels] on the formation of what we assume will be his serious political alternative, we can recognize in them the old Tupurkovski, who cares exclusively about populism based on universal popular love for the leader, a love that of course is always based on demagogy. Actually, this is not surprising at all, since at one time our former federal representative showed fascination with the charisma of Slobodan Milosevic, and was not even opposed at all to carrying out the antibureaucratic revolution, at least not publicly, and at least not while his pictures were being carried at popular rallies, up until the moment when the anthological "Malku Morgen" [Milosevic expression meaning "never"] fell among them. Likewise, however, it should be understood, as a mitigating circumstance, that he was active at a time when any thought in the former Yugoslavia about some sort of political changes was remote, and he entered politics through the front door, leaping over all the steps and as a protege of the big party bosses, virtually as a privileged individual, without any verification of his assumed qualities. Retaining that attitude toward reality, Tupurkovski has likewise been absent during the past period in which Macedonia has passed and is passing through a sort of Golgotha of international recognition and domestic transformation into a law-governed state. He observed the changes from a distance, and has not had any serious direct experience with the parliamentary system, and the open political struggle among parties which have learned some sort of lessons from their own experiences.

Now, suddenly, in one political speech at one special place and in front of a specific ethnic element, he is revealing himself to us as a messiah, announcing that there is no serious political alternative in Macedonia that would meet his strict criteria and cause his involvement. What is surprising in this regard is the silence of the parties and the absence of a need, if nothing else, to defend their own dignity and "past work," even though the same kind of observation by any reporter is regularly followed by party reactions.

Our assumption is that in contrast to a frivolous or nonexistent serious political alternative, someone, on his behalf and at his suggestion, will produce one for him in Macedonia and join it, which is a more realistic idea, knowing that Tupurkovski is not the type of politician who will fight on the open political scene as a competitor himself, since he might suffer blows, or else, on the basis of broad strata of the Macedonian population, he will create a movement for the moral and social ventilation of Macedonia. He will fill the vacuum in his scanty knowledge of the parliamentary system and its practice, in view of the kind of political milieu that he comes from and his "exile," as he probably wants to portray his leave from politics in the United States, with some new familiarity with the U.S. political system, in which there are strong leaders, interest groups, and lobbyists, combined with the old Yugoslav experiences.

If we assume that that is the case, the assurances being circulated that students and the University (the intelligentsia as Milosevic understands it) can be mobilized to support him sound logical, as do the assurances that interest groups in some state institutions, sports, and the church will lobby for him, as well as a certain ethnic population like the Aegean Macedonian community.

Nevertheless, the most unexplained element in his criticism of the current political situation, subject to all sorts of speculation, is the one labeled as abandoning the principle of equidistance from our neighbors and the offer of a policy of reciprocity, i.e., rapprochement with those who want to cooperate with us. A dilemma arises as to how and with whom Tupurkovski can implement this plan of his. Although it has not been elaborated on, for an initial analysis one can take into account his close contacts and good relations with one of the creators of the PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] Greek policy, Georgos Papandreou, which might be a plus given a normalization of relations, but which calls for attention, since it can be expected that it is in Greece's national interest to have Macedonia, identified with the Macedonians who are not Hellenes, disappear, and it thus occurs to us that any major rapprochement with Greece or with Serbia (because of their option of a strong confederation) may mean the end of the existence of the Macedonian identity, under pressure from two chauvinist policies based on long roads and numerically superior nations. The introduction of the Aegean Macedonian element as political support for "national Cile" therefore introduces a little confusion. If one takes

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

seriously the statement made once previously (not publicly, of course), immediately after the Lisbon Declaration that "Macedonia has lost the battle for its name," which was followed by his political disengagement and that of his close colleagues, that a mistake was made the moment that the historical name for this area, "Upper Macedonia," was not accepted (which is a distortion and manipulation of the historical fact, since the name under the Turks was Upper Rumelia), it is not clear how he could secure the support of the "Aegeans," who are alleged to be the most hard-core Macedonians and who will not give up the name while they are alive, unless he thinks that he will secure for them open borders with Greece so that they can visit their birthplaces and unless Greece, God forbid, does the same thing as Italy and "invents" dual citizenship for the Macedonians originating from the Aegean part of Macedonia. It will then probably be easier to swallow a possible change in the name, since he will have the political support of part of the people behind him.

Although in this case we are examining a gloomy speculation and publicly posing certain dilemmas, it is simply difficult to believe that anyone, even the most charismatic figure in the Macedonian heavens, "the eternal Cile," can carry out a Copernican revolution in the parliamentary Macedonia that has been established in the meantime, without any resistance and on the basis of populism; however, you are led to that by the thought that it is already being predicted with so much certainty that new early elections will be held a year and a half or so after the upcoming regular ones. Probably parliament and the government are not the ones who decide or propose elections, according to the constitution. If something like that happens, it will mean that all the political leaders and party options that have taken the thorny path of an open parliamentary struggle, also making serious mistakes, while getting rid of the distorted knowledge of democracy, were dilettantes and trash. It will also mean the death of the option that Macedonia decided upon, and the practice of street democracy.

Some of our colleagues have even put forward the theory that it is good that Tupurkovski has announced his intentions now, so that in time Gligorov, who has virtually pulled all the strings from his office during the past period, the government, which has acted in the background, and parliament, which has been more involved in things that are not its job, can return to their constitutional framework as a bulward against the assumed populist wave or the tendencies of individuals to proclaim themselves the fathers of their country. It is not even occurring to us, however, that at one time we saw the weakest place in the constitution as being precisely the inauguration of a semipresidential system, bearing in mind our inclinations toward the appearance and nurturing of messiahs, leaders, and saviors. That has also been demonstrated by the parties that demanded that the president be elected in elections and not in parliament.

In any case, even the very belief of some people that the Macedonian president already has his successor, a belief phrased more as an axiom, is putting us in the position of concluding that we have not gone beyond the beginning of the lesson of the multiparty system, political competition through elections, which means that there is no need for election campaigns with several candidates, when everything is known in advance.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

## Government Approves Revised Budget Proposal

*95BA0010A Trieste REPUBLIKA in Slovene 1 Oct 94 p 5*

[Article by Andreja Rednak: "The Government Has Adopted the Rebalancing of the Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana—"At yesterday's meeting, the government adopted, for the first time in several years, a proposal to rebalance this year's state budget. On Monday, it will forward the proposal to parliament, and propose to the deputies that they expedite its discussion, if possible by the beginning of November," said Andrej Engelman, state secretary in the Ministry of Finance.

In fact, the government has determined that the budget's basic revenues will be about 22 billion tolars higher than expected, and will amount to 416.5 billion tolars for the whole of this year. The budget's expenditures will be 12.8 percent higher, and will amount to a total of 420.4 billion tolars. The government will allocate a full 9 billion tolars to reduce the budget deficit, which will amount to 3.8 billion tolars, instead of the planned 12.8 billion; the budget's total domestic and foreign debt will be reduced from 29.5 to about 20 billion tolars. The largest increase in revenues is from a new estimate of sales taxes, which will be 17 billion tolars higher than expected (because of the more rapid growth of the gross national product, commercial turnover, and inflation); about 2 billion tolars will be contributed by the new tax on excessively high wages (approved only after the budget was approved); and income taxes will also be about 4 billion dinars higher (the estimate has been increased from 69.5 to 73.5 billion tolars). According to the rebalancing, 2.6 billion tolars more will be allocated for wages in the state administration and executive organizations; 200 million tolars more will be spent on defense (mainly for commissary services); and most will be spent on social transfers: specifically, 1.9 billion tolars more for child care, 800 million more for social security, 800 million more for veterans, 982 million for obligations to the ZPIZ [expansion not given], 500 million for scholarships, and 900 million for refugees. The gasoline tolar will bring in 15.1 billion tolars, or 1.8 billion more than planned, which should be forwarded to the Slovene Highway Construction Company.

In terms of the recipients, the picture will be as follows: The State Assembly will have 76 million tolars more, the State Council 34 million, altogether 56 million will be spent on the defender of human rights, the Constitutional Court will get 11 million tolars more, the Refugee Office 900 million, the Ministry of Finance 2.3 billion more (for obligations to the ZPIS [expansion not given] and DARS [Slovene Highway Authority], the Interior Ministry 122 million more, the Foreign Ministry 179 million more (obligations to Slovenes abroad and in Bosnia), Justice 232 million more (new legislation), the Ministry of Labor 3.7 billion more, education 3.7 billion more (mostly for redistributions), etc. The estimate of the gross national product increased from 1,643 to 1,772 billion tolars, i.e., by 8 percent. The share of budget revenues in the gross national product now amounts to 23.5 percent (previously 24), the share of expenditures amounts to 23.7 percent (previously 24.8), and the deficit 0.2 percent of GNP (previously 0.8).

Andrej Engelman also said that in October, the government was expected to send the State Assembly a budget memorandum for 1995, and at the beginning of December also a proposal for the next budget.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

## Federal

### Milosevic Receives Owen, Stoltenberg in Belgrade

*LD2610155594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1534 GMT 26 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 26 Oct (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Republic of Serbia has received Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen, the cochairmen of the Geneva conference, who arrived in Belgrade today.

As the president's office has announced, during lengthy and frank talks they exchanged opinions on the most important aspects of the Yugoslav crisis and the steps that need to be taken in the interest of establishing a permanent peace and normalizing relations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Particular stress was laid on the importance of treating equally all the participants in the peace process and all those who can contribute to its successful completion.

The expectation was voiced that in Bosnia the option of peace will prevail over the option of war as the true interest of the people living in that area and around it.

During the meeting, the expectation was also expressed that, in their mutual interest, the negotiating process between Knin and Zagreb would be resumed soon and that the resumption of the negotiating process would affirm the advantages of a peaceful solution to the crisis, the statement says.

The talks were also attended by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic.

## Serbia

### Interest in Partisan Press Declining

*94BA0421B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Sep 94 p 13*

[Article by Milenko Pesic: "Twilight of Partisan Press in Serbia: Politicians Do Not Know How To Make Newspapers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "golden age" of party publications is over; the daily circulation of POLITIKA three years ago was 18 times greater than the monthly circulation of partisan newspapers; parties are renouncing publications that they founded.

It appears that the "golden age" of the partisan press in Serbia is over. Only four years after the establishment of the multiparty system, there is almost no political party that still has its own regularly published mouthpiece.

On the eve of the 1990 elections, Serbia, freed from the party monolith, was inundated with various opposition publications. Who can still remember OTADZBINA, BELI ORAO, VELIKA SRBIJA, RADIKALNA REC, or JUGOSLAVIJA? Some issues of the party mouthpieces achieved high circulations three to four years ago. In some cases, individual "banned" issues of the mouthpieces surpassed individual daily newspapers in terms of the number of copies sold.

When DEMOKRATIJA, the mouthpiece of the Democratic Party, was revived, some of the public regarded that as a sort of cultural event. A dissident elite of literary-intellectual provenance gathered around DEMOKRATIJA in 1990, people such as Borislav Pekic, Milovan Danojlic, Kosta Cavoski, Dragoljub Micunovic....

After that takeoff, DEMOKRATIJA quickly sank back into oblivion. Dr. Zoran Slavujevic of the Institute for Social Science regards the quality of articles and the resources necessary for a newspaper to survive as the reasons for the twilight of the partisan press.

#### Why the Decline in Interest

"It is completely normal that there has been a drop in interest in the partisan press. There is little accessibility to such newspapers, printing is expensive, and without real journalists the question of the credibility of the publications themselves is raised. Some analysts indicate, for example, that the entire monthly circulation of the opposition press in 1990-91 was 18 times less than the daily circulation of POLITIKA," Slavujevic explains.

It is also interesting that the ruling party—financially the strongest—was unable to sustain the low circulation of EPOHA, an SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] NIN, as it was described in journalistic circles. Slavujevic believes that the Socialists do not even need a mouthpiece since they hold an adequate number of influential media in Serbia under their influence.

Ivan Cvejic, the deputy chief editor of DEMOKRATIJA, a new serial that resumed publication in May of last year after an interruption, says that every party should have its own mouthpiece. As far as the newspaper of the Democratic Party is concerned, almost all of the press run is sold by subscription.

Dr. Mihajlo Bjelica of the Yugoslav Institute for Journalism regards the disappearance of party publications as a reorientation by parties toward the most powerful media, especially electronic media.

"The flood of various opposition newspapers is over. Individual parties published one or two issues, ran their program and bylaws, and that was the end of it," says Bjelica.

The basic characteristic of the majority of partisan newspapers is unprofessionalism. According to Bjelica, even DEMOKRATIJA missed the opportunity to create a good publication from the journalistic point of view. "The only newspapers surviving are those that secure a wide readership and attract advertising," says Mihajlo Bjelica.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**No Future for Party Publications**

The only opposition newspaper that is surviving on the market is SRPSKA REC. Many regard that fortnightly as the mouthpiece of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], even though the title of the publication does not indicate that it was founded by the SPO. "Aside from Danica Draskovic and me, none of the journalists and members of the editorial staff at SRPSKA REC are from the SPO," says Bogoljub Pejcic, the chief and responsible editor of this independent newspaper, as it calls itself.

Pejcic stresses that SRPSKA REC is just as critical of the SPO as it is of other parties. "This is indicated by the sessions of the SPO Presidency. Not a single meeting of the SPO leadership, of which I am a member, goes by without someone directing criticism at the writing in SRPSKA REC," Pejcic explains.

The chief and responsible editor of SRPSKA REC feels that the SPO should have its own party mouthpiece. "One out of 10 buyers of SRPSKA REC is a member of the SPO," says Pejcic.

REPUBLIKA, the first alternative publication for political and social issues in the SFRY, has been in publication for six years now. Although that newspaper was founded by the UJDI [Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative], it later transferred its inaugural rights to the editorial board. The current editor of REPUBLIKA, Dr. Nebojsa Popov, indignantly rejects the allegation that REPUBLIKA is the mouthpiece of the Civic Alliance of Serbia. "Our publication is partisan if POLITIKA is too."

Between the two world wars, every self-respecting political party had its own newspaper. Dr. Mihajlo Bjelica believes that if multiparty democracy had not been extinguished in 1945, Grol's DEMOKRATIJA and Jasa Prodanovic's REPUBLIKA probably would have grown into strong journalistic enterprises by now.

## Mira Markovic Interviewed on Serb-Albanian Ties

*95BA0011A Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 19 Aug 94 pp 44-47*

[Interview with author Dr. Mira Markovic, wife of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and leader in the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, by Ruzdi Demiri; place and date not given: "Why Dr. Mira Markovic Was the First to Talk to the Albanians: How To Live Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Although the editor of Rugova's mouthpiece BUJKU, Ruzdi Demiri, was fired for interviewing the wife of the Serbian president, the text of which has never been published in Serbian until now, that interview was nevertheless a signal that Serb-Albanian relations are slowly beginning to thaw. The only question is who will negotiate for the Serbs and Albanians, and when.*

[Demiri] Ms. Markovic, political parties of all orientations have formed in the regions of Yugoslavia in recent years. You are one of the leaders of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia. Today it is not exactly advisable or worthwhile to be a communist and to still support a Yugoslavia. Does that have to do with an eternal and unquenchable ideal, resistance to the present and to cruel reality, resistance to toadyism and profiteering in politics, or...?

[Markovic] With regard to society, i.e., socialism, it has to do with my scientific conviction that overall economic, political, and cultural developments show that society is moving toward a phase in which, thanks to a high level of material and cultural wealth and more highly developed democracy, it will be possible to have equal relations among nations and people in all spheres of societal life—from economics to culture. In which there will be no economic exploitation, political subjugation, and so forth.

With regard to the state, i.e., Yugoslavia, I am convinced that the nations that lived together in the former Yugoslavia until two years ago cannot avoid living together again. Everything points to this coexistence: economics and culture, family and communication, the past and the future.

Thus, both my advocacy of a society of equal nations and people and my advocacy of Yugoslavia are in part scientific conviction, but also a protest against a reality that clashes both with my scientific convictions and with my feelings.

[Demiri] It appears that communism is dead. Even communist openness did not contribute to it being remembered in a favorable light. There are also efforts to assert as an irrefutable fact that communism is disappearing forever as a movement, as a philosophy, as a vision of a just and humane society of free, equal citizens. On the other hand, it appears that socialism in Yugoslavia in the Tito era is being increasingly remembered in a rosy light, like the Age of Pericles, for example. What do you think is closer to the truth and to an accurate judgment?

[Markovic] The facts are the closest thing to the truth. First, a communist society has never existed anywhere. It is simply a vision of a possible society in the future. The socialist society that existed in a number of Eastern European countries and which still exists today in certain other countries has its positive results which no one can question: stable economic development, a high level of employment, job security, social benefits and health care accessible to all members of society, free education at all levels for all children and youth, a low crime rate, the highest level of equality between the sexes and equality among the nations.... Because of advantages such as these, socialism bothered those societies, i.e., those systems, which were based on differences among nations and people. In other words, it induced those societies to lessen those differences. Socialism deserves a

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

great deal of credit for socializing, democratizing, and in general humanizing capitalism.

Of course, the development of socialism also brought with it many negative experiences. They related primarily to deformations of socialism. In many cases these deformations were so great that they compromised not only the practice, but also the ideal of socialism. That was the case with experiences in some of the countries of Eastern Europe. But these deformations in realizing an ideal are no reason to abandon the ideal. Especially if it relates to what is thus far the most humane ideal for organizing society, for structuring relations among nations and people.

[Demiri] Yugoslavia has disbanded. The state that was the realization of the grand dream of liberation from foreigners and unification of the South Slavs has disappeared. An ideal for which a dear price was paid in the past is disappearing today in bloodshed and a merciless war that threatens to lead to the mutual extermination of the nations living in this region. So is this a "Versailles creation," a "state that has no right to exist and that should be demolished with the Russians, the Americans, and all others who want that," or is this a matter of a sad mixture of domestic and foreign circumstances unfavorable to this sort of Yugoslavia?

[Markovic] It is the latter. As you say, a sad mixture of domestic and foreign circumstances unfavorable to this sort of Yugoslavia.

**The Only Future I Believe In**

[Demiri] One Yugoslavia is disappearing and another Yugoslavia is emerging, which pretends to be the successor to the previous one. Neither one is ethnically pure. By annexing some of the entities that have emerged "by the will of the people" in the territory of the previous Yugoslavia, this present-day Yugoslavia will probably grow in terms of both area and population, but even then it will not be "ethnically pure" because it will be at least 30 percent "other" populations, with a tendency toward a continuous rise in that figure. In that regard the theory of the nation—the state as the solution to all problems—ceases to apply. The absurdity of the slogan "all Serbs in one state" is evidenced by the fact that the Serbs were in fact in one state, but that some people thought that that state was too big, just as others may think the same thing about the current Yugoslavia later on. The conclusion that "Pasic was wrong to liberate and annex more territory than necessary" could be repeated as a bad omen, with every new split being just as bloody and pernicious.

[Markovic] I have already told you that I see the way out, the historic solution for all the nations of the former Yugoslavia, in its reintegration. These nations are so intermixed that it is impossible to separate them by any walls, be they ethnic, economic, national, political, or cultural. Having lived together for so long, we were not only knowledgeable about each other, but we even began to resemble one another.

That is how it is in all multiethnic communities. I really do not see how the descendants of Mexicans, Irishmen, Frenchmen, and Chinese in the United States can live together successfully as Americans while here, in this region, Macedonians and Croats or Serbs and Albanians cannot....

The ideal of European integration cannot be realized with disunited Yugoslav nations. In fact, I am convinced that that ideal of European integration also presupposes a greater level of connectedness among the nations of the Balkan peninsula. It is possible for all of them to find their way as part of a Balkan community, of nations, a union, an alliance... that would eliminate territorial, national, and cultural intolerance, competition, and mistakes.

The only future I believe in is a future in which the nations and people are mutually connected and mutually equal. Without that sort of future, the nations and people will endlessly exhaust themselves by fighting each other, which will threaten not only their development, but also their very survival.

[Demiri] What is the value of being a Serb today? What is the projected reality of a typical contemporary Serb? Does it coincide with the primordial national aspiration, with the religious conception of the Serb, with the traditional political ideal, created through the ages, of the Serbian nation, of the Serbian state, of the attitude toward oneself and the attitude toward other nations, toward the world around him?

[Markovic] Being a Serb or an Englishman, an Albanian or a Norwegian, means this everywhere, from my perspective: advancing one's own life, contributing to the advancement of the nation to which one belongs and the society in which one lives, but with respect for the interests of other nations and especially not to the detriment of other people, nations, and societies.

The historical legacy is also important in the shaping of an individual's attitude toward his own nation and toward the society in which he lives. However, that historical legacy is not critical to the shaping of that attitude. It cannot be that, especially in the modern world, on the very threshold of the third millennium, when education, scientific knowledge, and cultural achievements do have and should have a much greater influence than tradition on the shaping of man. Man should seek answers in the present and future, not in the past. The past should remain in books and museums, in memories (when man has time for memories), if he wants to advance.

[Demiri] Opposition to a national and civic state. People talk about the impossibility of a multiethnic, multiconfessional, multicultural community surviving, about the impossibility of coexistence, about permanent irreconcilability, permanent animosity.... People persistently try to prove this by pointing to everyday reality, and it appears that advocates of this view increasingly find

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

support for this from all sides. Where is that leading us and where could it lead us, what are the prospects for it, but also the alternative?

[Markovic] Multinational communities are not necessarily unrealistic in historical terms. On the contrary. The best example of this is the United States of America. With multiethnic communities, the ones that fail most often are those subject to outside pressure, the disintegration of which is the subject of certain economic and political interests outside those countries and where there is support for disintegration within the country itself.

I think that that was exactly the case with the former Yugoslavia. Its disintegration was in the interest of certain centers of economic and political power outside Yugoslavia, but those centers of power outside Yugoslavia found allies in Yugoslavia itself. It collapsed amid the united activity of its enemies outside the country and inside the country. It did not collapse because it was multiethnic. It collapsed because it was geographically, politically, and economically important to others, and it did not penetrate our consciousness that it is even more important to us. Others wanted Yugoslavia, and we gave them Yugoslavia.

**The Minimum on the Eve of the 21st Century**

Human and civil rights and liberties within a certain community, say, a state. What would be the minimum that would satisfy and allow for normal life, peaceful and prosperous?

[Markovic] On the eve of the 21st century, man should not think in categories such as a minimum. I regard equality as a dignified condition for the life of man in the modern world. That must be the minimum for man, for people of our age.

[Demiri] In vying to offer models to solve problems, party affiliation is increasingly becoming a factor, a measure for proving to one's own people one's manner of living, style, and behavior, aspirations and the reality of shaping, norms of conduct of the individual and the group..., together with arrogance, animosity in relation to others different from oneself. That is the corrupted human essence, a struggle for survival, a contorted projection of human aspirations, disregard for or manipulation of people or all that and something more?

[Markovic] Political parties in all of the former Yugoslavia were not formed on political foundations and are not expressions of various political orientations, as they should have been when we introduced the multiparty system. In some areas, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, political parties were formed on the basis of nationality, which excludes the political aspect from their activity. But in other areas of the former Yugoslavia as well, such as in this Yugoslavia, the majority of political parties at the very outset suspended their political orientation as a motif for organization and activity. Recently in Serbia, there were 112 registered parties. That would mean that they reflect 112 different political orientations, which of course is not true. The majority of parties are politically ill-defined, without a program that represents a political response to reality and provides a solution for tomorrow, with a fluid membership and an unestablished organization. Our multiparty reality right now somewhat compromises the ideal of multipartyism, through the number of parties, but also through their activity. Adherents of various political parties in our society do not behave like people with differing political views, but rather like personal enemies. And they are enemies who cannot lay down their weapons until the other lays down his, if possible forever. Our political parties resemble warring tribes.

[Demiri] Stereotypes or positions counterposed in reality or in political options: Kosovo, the Serbian myth and Albanian reality, the Serbian cradle and the Albanian child. In that regard, when and for whom does history begin, when is the right to existence acquired, the right to live in a certain territory, how is that right acquired, through birth, settlement, work, the granting of rights by someone, by taking it, acquiring it.... Who passes judgment on this, by what right, by what means, toward what goal.... Why and how does a certain territory become too small for life, for coexistence, why is there a right of precedence by a certain group of people, even in the event of the same ethnic origin?

[Markovic] Territory belongs to all those who live there. Regardless of who came first, regardless of religion, nation, sex, profession, education.... The highest criterion is man, or rather life. All those who live, work, and have children in a territory, protect and raise them, create their families, build settlements and roads, factories and schools, all those who create life have a right to that life.

**That Day, at Noon**

[Demiri] The Kosovo reality, and thus the reality in Serbia, the reality in Yugoslavia, the reality in the Balkans. The complete ethnic separation for several years now in nearly all segments of life, the suspension of Kosovo's autonomy on the one hand and the proclamation of a Kosovo state on the other hand, the suspension of provincial institutions on the one hand, the creation of republican institutions of power on the other hand, the elimination of education in the Albanian language within the system, the creation of an authentic republican school system for Albanians, the elimination of radio, television, and daily newspapers in the Albanian language, the establishment of satellite television and various newspapers in Albanian, the elimination of budget financing for Albanians, the creation of a Kosovo republican budget based on a tribute of 3 percent on every profit... and so on as far as the eye can see. Who will persevere, who will be the first to give in, the courses are diverging increasingly, and there are no points of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

contact on the horizon. What would be the necessary step that each side can and must take in order to find a just solution?

[Markovic] A rather just solution was found on 28 March 1989. On that day, at noon, through the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution of the SR [Republic of Serbia] at the formal session of the Serbian Assembly, the foundations were laid for a national balance in Kosovo. Serbia (within the framework of the then-Yugoslavia) succeeded in making its legal and political status equal to that of the other republics. Up to then its status had in fact been disrupted by the autonomy of the provinces, which threatened to cross the bounds initially conceived of for autonomy. In other words, all indications were that the provinces were becoming states. But by settling the legal and political status of the SR Serbia in that way, as a republic equal to the other republics in Yugoslavia, the national rights of Albanians in Kosovo were not disrupted. From work to politics to education to information, they remained equal to the Serbs in Kosovo in all ways.

I am personally convinced that on that 28 March 1989 a rather just balance was established between Serbia's right to statehood and the right to provincial autonomy, or rather between the interests of the Serb nation across the entirety of its state's functionality and the rights of the Albanian nation in Kosovo at that level of autonomy that will allow it to realize its interests, or needs, in the sphere of societal and individual life.

The escalation of nationalism in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, encouraged in large measure from abroad, led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. That nationalism could not pass Kosovo by. It is clear that right now both nationalisms are present there, which very often move toward their extremes. Serb nationalist and chauvinists would solve the problem of Albanians in Kosovo if not by expelling them, then at least by degrading them. Albanian nationalists and chauvinists would annex the territory of Kosovo to Albania, or at least turn it into a separate Albanian republic. These two extreme cannot be reconciled. The Albanian and Serb nations cannot live together, neither as Serbs and Albanians nor as people, if their interests are voiced by representatives of these two extremes.

But they can live together if their interests are voiced by the representatives of those two nations who do not regard the other nation as the enemy, or rather by those who do not wish the worst for the other nation. Serbs must be represented by those Serbs in Kosovo who are not bothered by Albanian children going to schools in which they are taught in their own language, who regard it as normal that Albanians have media in their own language. Under the condition, of course, that those schools and media are not a focal point for nationalism, separatism, and hatred. And the Albanians in Kosovo should be represented by those Albanians who are not bothered by the integrity of the Serbian state. Under the condition, of course, that that state not make Albanians second-class citizens and that it discourages the anti-Albanian attitude instead of supporting it....

The interests of the Albanian nation in Kosovo and the interests of the Serbian state must not conflict in the least, and they can even easily be harmonious if they are expressed by people of good will on both sides. This good will means a great deal and I will list several of its elements: that the people who express it are not nationalists and chauvinists; that they do not profit materially and in terms of status from ostensible patriotism; that they are not revanchists; that they respect the needs of others and their own word; that they sincerely wish good things for members of the other nation. A little or a lot, I do not know. But it is possible. Such people exist on both sides. They simply are not representing those two sides. At least not for now.

**Metaphor for the Serb Nation**

[Demiri] Ethnic logic. The population in Kosovo is 85 percent Albanian and 15 percent others, while some indications are that it is a ratio of as much as 90 to 10. Homogenization into two sides. The organization of separate existences for two separate communities, in schooling, health care, culture, the economy... and generations taught to live that way are already coming of age. In Kosovo, based on the historical principle, Serbia denies all the rights that it seeks for others based on the ethnic principle; human rights that are sought elsewhere are denied here on the basis of the state interest; civil rights are challenged on the basis of posited political and other norms relating to stated loyalty, and so forth.

[Markovic] The imbalance in the number of inhabitants of Serb and Albanian origin is indeed great. And it raises many questions that are not easy to answer. But it is better to answer those questions now, as soon as possible, than later, when it is not possible to fix things.

For example, Serbs in Kosovo care very much about Kosovo as a territory of the Serb nation and as a metaphor for the Serb nation. But Serbs are less and less interested in living in Kosovo. Living in Kosovo in smaller numbers, they are abandoning the territory, and taking the metaphor with them. By departing from Kosovo, they are not participating in its development, they cannot contribute to its economic and cultural prosperity. The only thing that those who have left are doing for Kosovo is to send messages and instructions from Sumadija or Banat, from Smederevo or Kikinda, to the state and its institutions on how life in Kosovo should be set up. And often on how to minimize the influence of Albanians in Kosovo. Even if that were honorable, and it is not, then it would be impossible. Thus, one should not and cannot minimize the influence of those citizens in a region where they are the predominant population.

But the Albanians are not responsible for the fact that they are the predominant population in Kosovo today;

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

rather, it is because of the Serbs, who are leaving Kosovo. If there was justification for leaving Kosovo 10 years ago because of the pressure and coercion to which Serbs were subjected from the Albanians at that time, those reasons no longer exist.

The battle for the development of Kosovo is being fought in Kosovo. Not in Sapac, or in Ruma, or in Belgrade, ultimately. The government in Belgrade cannot order Serbs who emigrate from Kosovo to return there. That would not be democratic. But by the same token, the Serbs who have left Kosovo, especially now that no one is threatening them there, cannot expect the government to effect an economic, social, and cultural transformation of Kosovo when those people who are interested in such a transformation are unwilling to take part in its implementation.

I had already answered the second part of the question in a previous response—those Serbs and those Albanians who live in Kosovo must live as equal citizens, as equal people. Two parallel lives are unfolding there now. One Albanian and one Serb. They can cancel out, they can form one common life, but under the condition that they meet each other halfway. They will come together only if they are not led by nationalists, or rather by nationalistic extremists.

**Way Out**

[Demiri] Based on your scientific and political knowledge and experience, where do you see a way out of this situation into which we have fallen, by our own fault or by someone else's doing, we who live in the regions of Yugoslavia which existed as a state for more than 70 years?

[Markovic] For several years the former Yugoslavia has been a battlefield of major national conflict. In some places, those conflicts have been such that they have have led to war. Fortunately, that war has not assumed broad proportions. But national tensions, expressed to greater or lesser degrees, continue to be present everywhere. I am convinced that this national intolerance is being encouraged from abroad, that it is being continuously fed by those centers of economic and political power outside Yugoslavia that had aspirations toward us. Emigre circles of all the former Yugoslav nations have also contributed to this expansion of nationalism. But these impulses, these pressures from outside Yugoslavia would not have had a chance here if they had not received support from within the country. Here, a fifth column was found in every nation that, by working to break up Yugoslavia, was working for foreign interests, not for the interests of its own nation.

There is a way out, of course. Both momentary and historical. It lies in uniting people to stop violence, hatred and impoverishment. In the interest of peace, solidarity, and progress. It would be very fortunate for all of us if we were to decide to impose a moratorium on all differences between us—national, religious, political, ethnic, generational... in the interest of preserving that which we all have in common: life. Faced with a threat to life, to a happy and peaceful life, which is the only important thing, for once we should not act as Serbs and Albanians, as Croats and Muslims, nor as leftists and rightists, nor as believers and atheists, nor as young and old, but simply as people. That is the way out for all of us if we want to live as people.

**[Box, p 45]**

**Answers of the Conscience**

Why the book by Dr. Mira Markovic is being read today more than others, so that the publisher, BMG, has already released a second supplemented edition of the Serbian first lady's "Answers."

"I will always be on the Left. That is where the struggle for the poor is being fought, for deprived nations and people, for the dignity of the human race, for a more just and kind planet," says Dr. Mira Markovic, regardless of the fact that communists have long since ceased to be fashionable here. "A new Yugoslavia will be born from the ashes that will be left behind by the fire in which our country is currently burning. Somewhere in this darkness, in the very heart of this anguish and humiliation, a new generation is emerging—of brave, modest, and better people."

This is no longer simply a matter of natural nostalgia for a better past, but rather—the author says—a matter of principle, because the left side of the world is more humane, more just, and the nicer side of the world.

Or it is, as writer Aleksandar Popovic noted appropriately, a desperate cry of "hope that today is the only salve for our severe wounds."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

## SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735,or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.